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IN LUCETUA

Familia 74: Ujamaa Safari

IN JUNE 1974 A MEETING
was held in Tanzania, a meeting
whose story bears the interesting
title "Ujamaa Safari." According to
the story in Risk magazine, "Familia
74 was a meeting planned jointly by
the World Council of Churches Unit
on Education and Renewal and the
International
Confederation
of
Christian Family Movements. It was
supported by the UN World Population Year Fund and other donors.
It brought together in Tanzania
from 54 countries about 250 men
and women for 15 days of meeting."
Some of the material reported in
Risk magazine was fascinating and
coincides well with the intention of
The Cresset to engage in discussions
about family life which (hopefully)
will contribute to the business of
reconstruction of the family, especially the Christian family. Bells
are ringing for marriage: some of
us hear them as insistent as fire
alarms. Humanity itself is at stake
with the family, for an attack on the
family is also an attack on human
personality, on men, women, and
children.
Ujamaa Safari was also concerned
about the reconstruction of the family. One of the elements that made
June, 1975

this meeting so full of promise and
its consequences (according to the
reports) so important, was the simple fact that married couples constituted the majority of the participants. Another element of value was
the visit made to "Ujamaa" villages.
Ujamaa villages are "familyhood"
villages- what the report calls "a
prime example of 'family socialism,'"
an African form of what is called the
extended family.
The report, including some of the
speeches by African leaders, shows
that the struggle for a basic model
for the family is going on in Africa,
too, although there is not yet the
presence of the "urban man" as in
the West. Members of the meeting,
particularly the Africans, were
sensitive to the interplay between
the model of the society and the
model of the family. The nation reflects the conception of the family,
and vice versa. The democratic ideal
for society and the emancipation of
women, as ideologies and movements, obviously collide with a patriarchal (or matriarchal) model
of the family, with a hierarchy of
social relationships. Whether or not
socialization of the family (and the
society) will remove exploitation,
produce more food and wealth, insure the equal distribution of wealth,
etc., is still to be seen. These con-

cerns of the people of Tanzania (and
of the participants in the conference)
must also receive prime attention
in our discussions about the family.
But deeper than these concerns is
the shaping of human lives and social existence where created and redeemed people grow in holiness.
Of extraordinary value and perception was Michel Evdokimov, "The
Family in Literature" (Risk, X, No.4
[1974], 29-32). After a brief comment
on Christianity and Marriage, the
author analyzes the myth in literature: being in love with unhappy
love where the aim and climax is
death. Other problems arose (he
says) in the West with industrialization and its attending revolution,
but the myth continued. Finally,
by means of a discussion of some
Russian authors, the author talks
about the purification of married
love through suffering. Notably absent from his comments is any mention of what must be one of the best
(if not the best) of books on the growing interior history of married loves,
Soren Kierkegaard's second volume
of Either/Or.
What The Cresset began in February 1974 with Ernst Schwidder's
"On Human Habitation," it continues in this issue with the Long
family's "The Shape of the Christian Family."
f
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Why Limit Public Service
Projects to Railroad Tracks?

SENATOR BIRCH BAYH (DIndiana) has been attempting to
prod federal railway authorities to
plan a massive project of upgrading
decrepit tracks in the bankrupt Midwest and Northeast rail corridors.
His program attempted also to tie
into the maintenance project the use
of some of the large number of unemployed. In March Senator James
Buckley (Cons.-NY) introduced a
plan calling for $500 million to provide 50,000 jobs in railroad improvement, a plan again related to both
the need for maintaining the roadbeds and tracks and for dealing with
recession unemployment.
Senator Vance Hartke (D-Indiana)
in an alternate but related plan suggested government ownership of the
railroads with a non-profit government corporation formed to purchase, refurbish, and maintain the
track. Hartke has said he introduced
his plans "only for debate purposes."
Rather than argue for the Bayh/
Buckley proposals and against Hartke's (although I think I would argue
in that direction), I would like to
raise another question: Why limit
public service projects to the railroad tracks? What about the maintenance of countless houses in many
sections of our cities and numerous
houses and out-buildings in rural
or small town areas? Why cannot
local jurisdictions organize local
work forces for such work, including
yard, lawn, garden, boulevard, and
4

park work? Local union people
could furnish leadership; old masters of various skills and arts could
furnish training for young people
who would be taught about wiring,
plumbing, gardening, tool maintenance, house construction and
maintenance. Local school personnel
could furnish leadership for local,
socially-related activity: singing,
folk-dancing, games, and contests.
There are many older, skilled people who could furnish leadership in
common food preparation for one or
two meals per day for the work crews
(and for others who might need the
meals). In this way young men and
women could be trained in matters
of diet, food preparation, management, etc.
And why not move into the areas
of constructing parks and hiking and
camping areas? Why not plant flowers, shrubs, and trees in the land
along the freeways? Gardening,
tree-pruning, care of flowers could
be taught and learned in the process. Many skills of craft and shop
could be put to genuine public service.
There are a number of adva:ctages
to such projects of public service:
the old masters of various trades and
skills could contribute to the education and training of younger people;
the young people could learn the
basics of house and yard maintenance without cluttering the expensive and inefficient school systems;
the building of a public spirit to improve and maintain both private
and public properties would be generated within the communities ; the
young who have difficulty securing
summer jobs and the unemployed
would receive both employment
and training.
Disadvantages can be overcome
if the financing and control are kept
close enough to the communities.
Problems with labor laws and union
regulations with wages and costs
could be solved if there were local
good will and broad national support. Such public spirit and public
service would be highly fitting as
a way to engage in the bicentennial
celebration.
J

Hagar or Sarahl
THE PROPOSITION: THE
strident and rigid claims made about
the Bible, particularly when such
claims do not have one text of the
Bible to support them, reveal the
presence of a religious covering for
a horrifying doubt, not a strong faith
boldly confessed. These claims are
a show of piety by which concessions
are made to a genuine, even innocent, piety. When such claims become the instruments for disciplining people for what they way about
the Bible, they reveal mistrust of
the Word of God.
Discipline there must be for disciples, discipline for discipleship
in faith and love. Discipline that is
coercive application of opinions, as
if such opinions were doctrine, not
only fails in the task of discipling in
faith and love; it reveals the mistrust of the Word of God. Such mistrust is camouflaged under pious
statements about the Word of God.
Indifference to pure doctrine,
betrayal of the truth, and concessive
sellout are to be disciplined. They,
too, are signs of unfaith and tokens
of mistrust in the Word of God. But
discipline is not the exercise of
rational or religious powers to force
God's promises to come true. God's
blessing comes at God's initiative,
by his spoken promises.
Discipline is to train the crushed
and stripped heart to receive, cling
to, and trust nothing else than the
promises of God to bless. Faithful
people, trusting the Word of God,
exercise discipline. They count on
The Cresset

the Word of God to reveal, condemn, and break the illusions of
religious attachments that are idolatrous opinions or spiritual errors.
And they count on the Word of God
to train the broken heart to trust the
forgiveness of sins for Christ's sake.
This Word of God purifies the soul.
Such purification by that Word of
forgiveness through Christ's cross
is received by faith. The pure heart,
like pure doctrine, receives its purity in that nothing else than this
cross of Christ is believed or taught
for the blessed life of purity. Discipline is for unity of faith, not conformity to opinions.
Abraham, even while he lived in
the midst of idolatry, received the
spontaneous promise of God to bless
him, to make him a blessing, and
through his descendant to bless all
the nations of the world. And yet,
after he had waited so long, it seemed
to Abraham that the promised blessing would come true on!y if he made
it happen. He took action appropriate to his own opinion. While the
copulative union with Hagar produced a son, "forcing" the promise
did not bring the blessing. On the
contrary: Abraham's action brought
conflict in his own household, hostility that finally brought division by
expulsion. The child born of Hagar
became a child of the wilderness, an
enemy and persecutor of God's
chosen people.
The union with Sarah was the
union of faith in the promise. From
that union came the son of promise,
the son of freedom . The sons of
promise also are disciplined: true
and genuine discipline for discipleship in freedom is the trust in and
use of the Word of God which ties
hearts and lives of God's people
together in the blessedness of that
promise. The Word of God alone,

received by faith alone, can do this
work of God. No other discipline,
rational, legal, or religious, can
achieve this work.
f

Where most of us use file boxes and
cards to gather such information,
"Ber" uses her memory. She is
shrewd in her knowledge, and full
of charity. For this reason she is
aware of motives and pressures that
are best cloaked in modest restraint.
And yet, she is neither cynical nor
disloyal. Valparaiso University owes
much to the Guild women, and this
debt focuses in a special way in
"Ber." We wish for her and her husband an inner fulness of contentment and days of hopeful joy.
f

NOTES FROM THE EDITOR'S
NOTEBOOK
ALTHOUGH THERE ARE
many (too many, in my opinion)
denigrating comments made about
little (old) women in tennis shoes,
my experience with Ladies' Aids and
with the women of the Valparaiso
University Guild has made me suspicious of the makers of the comments rather than of those commented on. This is especially and
pre-eminently true about Bernice
("Ber") Ruprecht, for many years
the Executive Director of the Valparaiso University Guild.
We salute this remarkable woman
as she concludes her years of service
to the University, via the Guild.
"Ber" is a remarkable woman; she
and her husband Emil have built
a marriage which has exhibited to
us all, even those with bad eyesight,
the truth of the apostolic teaching
about the relationship between husband and wife displaying the relationship between Christ and his
church.
"Ber" has a gracious tenacity, a
winsome durability. She remembers
countless women by name, recalls
events and people in their lives,
and gives thoughtful attention to
them without fawning or flattering.

PROFESSOR THOMAS HALL'S
review essay of the N arnia stories
by C. S. Lewis continues the tradition of The Cresset to contribute to
a summer reading program. We
hope our readers will benefit from
the thoughtful reflection of Professor Hall. The Narnia stories, as
much as any literature we know,
make excellent reading for the whole
family. The happy memory of our
own family reading these stories
fuels our hope that families will not
only set aside such time to read
them at home, but perhaps even to
take the books along for reading
during the vacation.
Correction
We apologize for the inaccurate
information given in the by-line
for Clarence Rivers, Jr. in the
May (1975) issue of The Cresset,
page 13. The information should
be corrected to read as follows:
"Clarence Rivers, Jr., ACSW,
received the MSW degree from
Indiana University (1967). In
addition to his teaching duties,
Mr. Rivers is Chairman of the
Department of Social Work at
Valparaiso University."

And for us this is the end of all the stories, and we can most truly say that they all lived
happily ever after. But for them it was only the beginning of the real story. All their life
in this world and all their adventures in Namia had only been the cover and the title
page: now at last they were beginning Chapter One of the Great Story, which goes on for
ever: in which every chapter is better than the one before. (The Last Battle)
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From 20 to 23 October 1974, members of the Departments of Art, Philosophy, Theology, the School of Law, and
Christ College of Valparaiso University, presented "LIGHT ON LIFE: Films and Discussion on Euthanasia and Abortion." The Cresset herewith presents four of the papers of this conference together with a transcript of one of the discussions.
Reprints of materials on abortion published in The Cresset are available. The reprint includes the following articles:
John Strietelmeier, "Legalized Homicide" (April, 1973); Richard Stith, "In Response to Those Who Ask Why I Care
About Abortion" (December, 1973); and the articles in this present issue from the "Light on Life" series. Single copy,
35~ in multiples of 10, ea. 30~ in multiples of 100, ea. 25(. The postage will be paid if payment accompanies the order.
-KFK

Moral and Theological Issues in the Abortion Controversy
DR. CALVIN j. EICHHORST

IT IS NOT OFTEN IN THE COURSE OF LIFE'S
pilgrimage that one comes to a place where one says,
"Here I stand!" but that is precisely my history on the
abortion question. To provide a context in which such a
stance makes sense I want to relate it to three other significant issues which are part of that pilgrimage: ecumenism, the war in VietNam, and the race issue. When
dealing with all three of those in the course of fifteen
years I was at home in the more liberal wing of the religious and ecclesiastical community. Because of abortion
I am at home there no longer.
In 1958, the year when Pope John XXIII was elected
Pope, I was one of the initiators of a dialogue between
Lutherans and Catholics which continued for twelve
years. At that time it had to be done sub-secreta lest the
two academic institutions involved find their standing
in the larger ecclesiastical community jeopardized.
Anti-Catholicism among Lutherans was taken for
granted. The same was true of anti-Protestant sentiment
in the Catholic community. Then in the mysterious
providence of God's Spirit, Pope John was moved to
convoke an Ecumenical Council. It started in the fall of
1962. When the final session began in 1965 I was there,
personally observing what I could not have hoped for
or even imagined ten years earlier. The embrace of
love which swept over much of the Christian community
of the world was nothing short of astonishing.
But today anti-Catholicism is again on the rise. The
abortion question seems to have assumed paramount
importance. Catholics are being subjected to a strategy
of isolation. Abortion is being turned into a Catholic
issue and few are the Protestant ecumenists willing to

Calvin f. Eichhorst, pastor of Atonement Lutheran
Church, St. Cloud, Minnesota, received his PhD (1972)
from Yale University . He has published in The Lutheran Standard, "Abortion: An Act of Dehumanization"
(August 18, 1970), and in Dialog, "Abortion-No!"
(Winter 1973).
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rise to challenge that claim. The wider witness of the
Christian church of the world, especially of that such as
the Lutheran Church of Norway which stands firm in
opposition to abortion, is being selectively dismissed.
Because of my own past my witness on abortion shall be
sensitive to ecumenical dimensions. With pride I again
will stand alongside my Roman Catholic brethren in
Christ.
The crisis precipitated in America by the Viet Nam
war pressed in upon me so I could not sit that controversy
out. I became involved in the protest and supported
Senator Eugene McCarthy for the presidency in 1968
while I was active in the Democratic Party. From that
experience I learned much about the verbal manipulation of reality. McCarthy called the language in vogue
over the newscasts made available to the public from the
Department of Defense, "Pentagonese." You remember
those statements about "protective reactionary strikes,"
"body count," "saving a country even if we have to destroy it to do so."
In dealing with the race issue in the sixties I also got
an education about the way a nation had manipulated
reality by manipulating language. While a college professor for a number of years I had the privilege of being
an Advisor to an Afro-American Student League. The
history and experience of those black young men and
women pressed in upon me. I learned how blacks had
been dealt with not as persons but as property; I learned
how anthropologists and psychologists from leading
universities were measuring brain capacity by pouring
lead shot into skulls in an effort to determine whether
they were closer to homo sapiens or apes.
What I confronted in a powerful way both on the war
and the race issue was the process of DEHUMANIZATION through the verbal manipulation of reality. It
points up what I regard as one of the major moral questions which must be confronted on the matter of abortion. IT IS THE QUESTION OF TELLING THE
TRUTH. To demonstrate what is involved we need
only be reminded of what happened on ihe war and race
The Cresset

issue in terms of our visual perception of truth and reality. The media portrayed the war for us in real blood
and guts color, bringing it right into our living rooms
and bedrooms via TV. We were exposed to My-Lai in
all of its brutality. The weekly news magazines did not
spare any gory details.
During the March on Selma, now ten years ago, the
confrontation on the bridge was captured by the media
in such a way that we could see the gushing of blood
following the pounding of clubs. We saw the dogs tear
the skin of blacks. With both the war and the race issue
this was a way of telling the truth . To tell it thus was to
TELL IT LIKE IT IS! There was no outcry in principle that this was wrong, or too emotional. Rather, emotion was part of packaging truth.
But, when it comes to abortion there is an assumption
operative in much of the same community of people
who so favored "telling it like it is" that to show slides
of aborted babies is gruesome and a blatant appeal to
emotion. How in principle can such an objection be sustained in view of what was acceptable in the previous
cases?
The question of telling the truth should arise in our
minds whenever we run into that process of rationalization which began in the Garden of Eden and is being
perfected regularly, not in the least of all in the academic
community. It is present in the attempt to construe the
matter of becoming pregnant in such a way that it is
thought of as an "accident" or "happening" -language
which treats those involved in events as victims. At best
this is a verbal game and at worst an insult to what is
involved in human personhood in terms of responsibility for moral consequences.
The second moral issue of major consequence deserving of attention concerns the child which is truly the
innocent victim of abortion. What are we going to say
about the unborn child developing in a woman's womb?
How are we going to decide whether or not he or she has
enough humanity to merit protection within the society?
Here we must be clear about the current status of the
unborn child before the law as a result of the Supreme
Court decision of January 22, 1973. Right now in the
state of Minnesota where I live this child does not have
as much legal protection as the hub caps of my car. This
is not a neutral position ; it presupposes a firm moral
commitment. Life at this stage and in this form has been
denigrated in a way that fifteen years ago was unimaginable. The unborn child is put in a position which none
of us would want to share for one single instant of our
lives. If all laws were abolished tomorrow, the first law
to be re-established the next day would be that which
protects us from being killed.
The real issue here is not so much whether this child
in the woman's womb is scientifically a human being or
a person but whether or not this human life has value.
Does it have value in itself or does it have value only
in terms of the wants and desires of others. Is there
intrinsic value to human life at all stages of developJune, 1975

mentor is value conferred in terms of function? We have
become victims of our language, and our desires. What
is involved in being human is being torn from any foundation in biological fact and substructure. Reality has
come to be understood almost totally in sociological
terms. The strong-not in terms of IJ.lilitary might but
in terms of making their position prevail by one means
or another- are deciding who is human. They are deciding about the weak. Here too definitional dehumanization masks reality. What is developing in the woman's
womb is not a child but a fetus; it is "protoplasm," a
"glob of tissue," "products of conception," or "stuff for
the garbage can." Abortion then is not the killing of
human life but is the "termination of pregnancy"- perhaps a new kind of "protective reactionary strike."
What is all the more astonishing is that the current
dehumanization of the child is taking place precisely
at a time when we are learning more and more about
the intricacies and wonder of its biological and psychological development. If one were to take seriously
the quest for scientific truth and observe those who
avoid and abuse it, one could hardly keep from becoming cynical about education and the quest for knowledge. Perhaps that is what has happened and many have
sunk into despair. Death holds fascination and power;
to embrace it is to assert oneself in a final act of defiance
and power.
The third moral question of enormous consequence
is present in terms of what abortion does to women. If
trPating the child like another thing to be kept or loved
in terms of tastes and desires represents a consumer
oriented society at its worst, the exploitation of women
through abortion represents male chauvinism par excellence. Who has the abortion? The woman. Who made
her pregnant? The man. Where does total responsibility
for contraception or birth control lie in terms of present societal expectations? Totally with the woman. After extensive involvement with this issue over the past
six years I have had to conclude that women are being
had. Men have gotten off the hook almost entirely when
it comes to responsibility for sexual behavior.
Ironically, many who fight vociferously to keep from
falling captive to the computer or to modern technology
have surrendered themselves totally to technology as
it relates to sexual behavior. There is profound anxiety
about evacuating the earth in the form of strip mining,
leaving it barren. There is little corresponding anxiety
about evacuating the uterus leaving it barren and a
wasteland.
Not many years ago I taught college students what
Harvey Cox had written about Playboy morality as being fundamentally anti-sexual because women are treated
as objects to be played with, manipulated, and used.
They are not to be related to as persons. With the coming of abortion much of women's liberation has bought
into the logical extension of Playboy morality. It was
the back-up system for those playthings who got caught.
7

Men are willing to play and perhaps to pay but women
are the losers.
There is mounting evidence of how women lose both
medically and emotionally. The pro-abortion media is
not likely to show its own mistaken judgment in the
past by bringing to public attention the results of studies
coming out of the Eastern European countries, Japan,
and England, indicating how devastating abortion really is to women. Through abortion women are endangering their future child bearing capacity; they are increasing very significantly the risk of tubal pregnancy; they
are opening the door to far greater risk of premature
births with consequent deformity and retardation. Perhaps most of all, women are in danger of losing their
dignity and surrendering their bodies to be controlled
far more by men than by themselves.
THUS FAR I HAVE DEALT WITH MORAL
issues without developing the grounds for the appeal
that I have been making for what is morally good or
right. Now, by contrast, I shall make a conscious appeal
to religious grounds, and thus deal with three of the
many theological issues that are at stake in abortion. I
assume that someone who is Christian does make decisions regarding action, thought, and behavior with reference to the Bible and theological content.
A major theological issue which must be faced in the
abortion issue is the matter of Christian freedom. What
is Christian freedom? Certainly it is not the freedom to
do as one pleases or function merely in terms of one's
conscience. It is not the freedom to do "one's own thing."
To live thus would be to live according to what the
apostle Paul calls "the flesh ." While Christians should
pay serious attention to their conscience- as anyone
should- that conscience should be formed and informed
on the basis of the Bible, particularly the normative
revelation of God in Christ. Conscience does not function so much to give us information about what is right
or wrong as it does to tell us whether we are going to act
or have acted according to what we believe to be right or
wrong. For Christians it might be stated that conscience
functions to inform us whether or not we are acting according to what we believe to be the will of God. Of
course, we might always be wrong about precisely what
we believe the will of God to be. That is not for us to
decide willy-nilly but a matter to surrender up to the
Scriptures as they are interpreted to us in the Christian
community.
I am willing to say categorically that the language as
it is used within the abortion movement which speaks of
the "right of the woman to control her body" is not Christian. No Christian, neither male nor female, has the
right to control his or her body as he or she pleases. The
body in Christian terms is the temple of the Holy Spirit.
God does not work out his will for us through some nonmaterial entity called soul but rather works it out through
us in our full corporeality. He takes on human flesh in
8

us even as he took on human flesh in Jesus whom we
confess as the Christ. The Spirit of God is the major
point of control in terms of freedom to use our body.
Christian freedom which is truly Christian does not
seek the freedom to destroy the body of another merely
for keeping my plans uninterrupted or achieving some
career goals which I have set for myself. Christian freedom does not liberate me to sacrifice another human being but liberates me to sacrifice for another. The kind
of freedom to which the gospel calls me is freedom to
suffer and die for someone else. It does not give me freedom to force them to suffer and die.
We ought to name much of the rhetoric about freedom
precisely what it is; it is a practical heresy. The freedom
language of the abortion movement does not have its
roots in the Christian faith, in spite of efforts being made
to read the history of the church that way. The freedom
of the gospel is being distorted; it is being transformed
into a principle of human liberation which has its roots
in the Enlightenment, not in Scripture.
A second point where appeal can be made on theological grounds concerns the unborn child. While a
strong case can be made from the biblical texts which
explicitly deal with the child developing in the womb,
such as Psalm 139, let me suggest that we appeal to the
Scripture which defends the weak and defenseless members of a community. The Christian community is indeed an advocate on behalf of the weak and powerless.
Thus the poor, the orphan, and the widow had a special
place in God's covenant concern. The. unborn child
should be seen in relation to that same concern. He or
she should be kept within the sphere of neighbor- to
be guarded and protected from brutal attack.
A theology which directs us to join the exploiters, the
strong against the weaker members of society is a theology which has lost its substance. It is bankrupt and should
be called into question prima facie. Why is it that we
have begun to comprehend that in relation to minorities and the poor but cannot see it in our society in terms
of the unborn child? Is it because we do not know the
truth or is it because we will not do the truth.
In the third place, seen theologically, abortion is part
of a secular and demonic quest for perfection. Man cannot accept himself as fallen and must not accept salvation given by God. In a society which values life ultimately according to physical health, sexual potency,
and capacity for sensual enjoyment, s~lvation must be
achieved on those terms. The perfect physical speciman
must be developed. There is not room for those who are
deformed, those who are unwanted, those who are retarded. The new biological utopia must be man's own
doing.
Precisely here the Christian critique on the basis of a
doctrine of creation and the fall must be brought to bear
on the whole process or 1984 will not be a joking matter.
In fact, it no longer is a joking matter.
The Cre sset

IN CONCLUSION LET ME COME FULL CIRCLE
to state that we as Christians must be prepared to stand
in a posture that puts us more in conflict with secular
society. The cross will again have to be seen as something more than optional equipment for a Sunday stroll.
A new form of witness is called for from the Christian
community. For this we have on our side a long and illustrious history. It dates back to the time when Christians worshiped in the womb of the earth, carving out
catacombs to cope with a hostile society intent on destroying the Church in infancy.
Professor George H. Williams of Harvard, a Unitarian clergyman, who has researched the abortion question during those early centuries, has written that in
Roman imperial society Christians were not distinguished from others by what they wore, or where they
worked, or what they ate. But among the distinguishing

marks were these mentioned by Diognetus: "They did
not cast off their children to die of exposure on the
rocks, they did not sell their children into slavery. And
they did not abort their offspring." In this tradition he
has indicated that Luther and Calvin also stood firm. It
was the tradition of the Christian church in an overwhelming way up until the past fifteen years. With courage we are called to make it ours again.
When I think of the kind of witness that is called for,
I am reminded of what Einstein said about the way Germany fell under the spell of Hitler's power. First he
looked to the universities thinking that surely there
men of knowledge and courage would speak up. But
they were silent. Then he looked to the press with their
freedom and power. But they were silent. Then he looked
to the Church. There was a word of witness and some
resistance offered. That word of witness and resistance
is needed once again.

'

DONALD A. AFFELDT

Notes in Response to Dr. Eichhorst

MY REMARKS THIS EVENING HAVE BEEN
billed as "A Response" to Dr. Eichhorst, who sees acts
of abortion as posing a "threat to Christian Faith." If
you noticed the Torch• of last Friday, you learned there
(as indeed I myself did) that I am, as the saying goes,
"pro-abortion." Thus I expect some of you may await
my comments with considerable fascination, since you
may think that you are about to be treated to the bizarre
spectacle of someone in a Christian University deliberately threatening the Christian Faith or advocating
death for the unborn or generally furthering the cause
of perversity. I regret, however, that I will satisfy no
such expectations, at least not consciously or deliberately.
This is not due to a lack of nerve, I want you to know,
for it takes some nerve to register even a qualifying
voice, let alone a dissenting opinion, before an assembly
such as this and as a part of a program which qui.te clearly (and no doubt properly) is designed to celebrate the
value of life and to promote its continuation, particularly
in the case of the unborn. Rather, my hesitancy to stake
out a clear pro-abortion position derives from my own
uncertainties as to defensible positions on the whole

Don A. Affeldt, Assistant Professor of Philosophy and
Law in Christ College, Valparaiso University, received
his MA (1965) from the University of Chicago. He has
published frequently in The Cresset.
June, 1975

range of issues which must be dealt with under that general subject heading. These uncertainties, in turn, derive from the immense complexity of any one of those
issues. So the most I hope to do in the few minutes allotted to me this evening is to suggest why some of us
find ourselves unable to take a clear and unambiguous
stand on the question of abortion, and furthermore to
sketch an agenda of discussable questions the resolution
of which seems to me to be a pre-condition for any defensible viewpoint on so weighty and problematic an
issue area as is abortion. Finally, the matter of abortion
has been much discussed on this campus and in the country at large in the last few months, often by people far
more knowledgeable on the medical, legal, theological,
economic, sociological, or biological aspects of the issue
than I could ever hope to be. I shall try to confine my
concerns to the moral questions involved and, even
more particularly' to aspects of those moral questions
that have perhaps received less attention in the foregoing discussion than they should have.
The first point I should like to remind you of is that
in all except the most extraordinary cases, becoming
pregnant is not something that a woman does, or that
she and her mate do, but rather something that happens
to her, or, if you like, to them. That is to say, the onset
of pregnancy is not, typically, an action. It is, rather,
•The Torch is the student newspaper of Valparaiso University.
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in the classical sense of the term, a passion, something
undergone. To be sure, there are actions that women can
take to affect the probability of this event occurring, but
the point remains that in the simplest and most straightforward sense of the term, getting pregnant is not something a woman does. Indeed, it is usually weeks after the
event, sometimes months, before the woman knows that
the event has transpired.
A second, and perhaps equally obvious, point is that
the abortion controversy centers on only those women
who do not want to bear a child, or, more precisely, who
do not want to bear this child. If a woman does want to
bear the child with which she is pregnant, then presumably she will do so. In any case, so far as I know there is
no one who is presently advocating that pregnant women
who do want to bear their children be denied the right
to do so. In sum, then, the problem of abortion may be
said to concern only those women to whom something
has happened, namely getting pregnant, which they did
not want to have happen, and the consequences of which
seem to them to be undesirable.
As a parenthesis here, I might add that many qualifications could, and probably should, be attached to
these observations. We could, for example, go into the
question of when and under what circumstances people
may engage in sexual intercourse that has any chance
at all of producing a pregnancy. Or into the question of
the purpose, if there is just one, of sexual intercourse.
Or into the theological question of whether pregnancy
is an act the agent of which is God Himself, the patient
of which is the mother, and the means for which are the
sperm of the father and the ovum of the mother. I lay
all these interesting questions aside for the moment so
as to stick as close as possible to the moral question of
abortion itself. If it will help matters for you, imagine
that there is at least one case fitting the description I
am sketching, and interpret my remarks as applying just
to that one paradigm case of moral decision-making
about abortion.
Now this woman to whom something has happened
that she did not want, namely getting pregnant, is presently in our legal order faced with a choice between two
basic alternatives: she can undergo an abortion to end
the pregnancy or she can undergo the rest of the pregnancy. Note, please, that neither her biological makeup nor the present state of technology offer her the
choice of reversing the process, of making the fetus
magically disappear or be absorbed into the body, or of
instantly having a baby or a miscarriage. That is, there
is no single specific act that the woman can perform
which will put an end to the matter. On the contrary,
the woman's choice is only between two further happenings to her: continued pregnancy to term or discontinued pregnancy via surgical procedures of varying degrees of hazard and complexity.
With even so sketchy a description of the woman's
situation in hand, some observations can be made about
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the moral dimensions of her plight. First, on the assumption that we have properly described this woman's
situation as one she did not choose and one she does not
want, and which she did not deliberately and knowingly
create, her moral choice is properly viewed as a choice
between the lesser of two evils. The question she faces
is not the general question of whether to abort or not
to abort, on an analogy with, say, whether to deceive or
not to deceive, or whether to steal or not to steal- questions which, in the abstract, admit of only one answer.
Inasmuch as abortion always involves some pain and
suffering for a woman, on that ground alone it is presumptively immoral- provided the consequences of
not aborting are not themselves even worse. Yet that is
precisely her situation: the consequences of her remaining pregnant would be at least as bad, in her mind, and
probably worse, all things considered. Thus no abstract
judgment on the moral quality of the act, described simply as the act of abortion, helps to deal with this woman's moral dilemma. And we do her an injustice, therefore , if we formulate her moral problem without giving
due weight to the perceived undesirable consequences
of the alternatives available to her.
Nor, I think, is her problem fairly depicted by ignoring the possibility of choice that confronts her. There
was a time, not so long ago, when a moral choice for
abortion was considerably more difficult to defend .
This was because abortion techniques were more primitive, medical knowledge was not so far advanced , and
the laws proscribed abortion. These factors do, I think,
properly bear on whether or not the woman should
abort. Now, however, the situation has changed to the
point where abortion is both a relatively safe procedure,
so far as maternal health is concerned, and a legal action,
within limitations. While changing circumstances have
not disposed of the moral problem- indeed, in some
respects, they have clarified the basic issues involvedit is, I think, a mistake not to recognize the changing
nature of the problem. Nor is it an adequate response to
the problem to ignore or overlook the very real possibility of choice that confronts the woman. In general,
we might say that as choices become available, action is
possible and with action, morality enters the picture. In
the New Testament period, for example, I doubt very
much whether having a baby was thought by anyone a
matter for moral decision, simply because you either
got pregnant or you didn't, and if you did there wasn't
much you could do about it. But now there is, and to
suggest that we mentally roll back the clock and adopt
the simple attitudes of a prior generation is not to solve
the problem, but rather to ignore it. To state the point
more explicitly, unwanted pregnancies have always occurred in history, but their being unwanted was, until
fairly recently, not a good reason for terminating them,
simply because there was either nothing to be done to
accomplish that end, or because whatever the remedy
was, it was worse than the problem. Accordingly, if the
time ever comes when no one gets pregnant except those
The Cresset

women who choose to do so and want to carry their children to term, the problem of abortion will largely vanish.
As it is, we presently find ourselves in an intermediate
situation where something can be done to prevent unwanted pregnancies and something can be done safely
to terminate them if they have not been prevented.
What needs deciding now is what reasons are sufficient
to morally justify our exerting the control that we have
in our power. I personally am of the opinion that in our
present state of technology, and assuming an average
level of awareness or education on the part of potential
parents, the burden has shifted to them to provide reasons for having children in the first place. It is no longer
sufficient to say, "Well, it's just natural," for at least in
our culture, becoming pregnant is not altogether just
natural. I am not suggesting that any very complicated
set of reasons currently needs to be furnished to justify
having children. It may be sufficient, at present, for the
parents to say, "We genuinely want a child, and will care
for it to the best of our ability." Yet perhaps some time in
the future this reason will not suffice for purposes of
moral assessment. Much as we may presently regret any
such development, we certainly de not cope morally
with it by refusing to admit that it may exist-or perhaps even does already exist to a greater extent than we
presently realize.
We are now at the point, I might add, where considerations which previously did not justify abortion now do.
Where for good and sufficient reason the woman believes that her pregnancy will produce a seriously defective child she has a reasonable basis for preferring an
abortion to a continuation of her pregnancy. What has
changed is the reliability of advance indicators of deformity or defectiveness, and this change in the reliability of our knowledge changes the moral situation of a
woman affected by it. I would like to draw on an analogy
easily misapplied in this sort of situation. A doctor who
discovers two or three small tumors in a woman's breast
may now be justified in performing a radical, as opposed
to a so-called simple, mastectomy on the woman, whereas he once was not, morally speaking. This is because
he now has the technology to form a reasonably accurate idea of the probability of the cancer's persistence
without radical surgery. Furthermore he knows with
reasonable certainty the consequences of the disease for
the woman, in terms of pain, suffering, and perhaps
death. Similarly, a woman in the very early stages of her
pregnancy who learns that her child is probably defective in a way that may cause it pain, continuing perceived hardship, or an early death, has a reason, to
the basis of that knowledge, to choose abortion. Just ten
or fifteen years ago she may not have had that alternative. This is just a sketch of some of the ways that advancing knowledge, technology, and burgeoning possibilities for action affect our changing moral situations.
The tendency to overlook or deny the more significance
of changes in culture and technology in favor of hard
rules formulated in view of simple choices does little
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justice, I think, to the reality of the moral complexities
we face in an issue such as we find in the problem of
abortion.
SO FAR I HAVE BEEN ADDRESSING THE
moral question of abortion largely from a conceptual
and physiological point of view. Even with this limited
perspective some light can, I think, be shed on the moral
problem. The questions multiply exponentially, however, when we remind ourselves that abortion happens
to involve the taking of a human life. The questions
multiply when seen in that light precisely because human life itself is seen by many people to be the most
valuable thing there is, to be set aside as a value by nothing whatsoever at any time, and because all the other
things that we value are intimately, even physically,
connected with human life. Because of the importance
of the concept of human life to discussions on abortion,
I should like to devote the remainder of my remarks to
the bearing this concept has on some of the moral questions that arise in this connection.
First, I said that abortion happens to involve the taking of a human life. I see no essential connection between the idea of abortion and the idea of the loss of
life. Abortion essentially involves premature delivery
of a human offspring, usually with the intention that it
not live. But that, of course, does not entail that the
offspring was living already in the sense in which it is
denied future life in the act of abortion. The point here
is a conceptual one again, and I bother to mention it
not so much because I think it is presently important
to clear moral thinking about abortion, but rather because I think it might become important to future discussions about the problem. As a matter of fact, we presently have no clear and uncontroversial procedures,
methods, or concepts for precisely demarcating and
identifying life in all of its morally relevant forms.
Yet we might one day devise such procedures or develop
such concepts, and, in that event, we may be able to deal
more clearly with problems like abortion and euthanasia. Lacking such conceptual and technological precision, however, it seems pointless to deny that, from a
taxonomic point of view, the fetus is human and, from
a medical point of view, it is alive rather than, say, dead.
So for the present, moralists who tolerate abortion in
any form must, it seems to me, cope with the problem expressed in terms that stipulate that abortion involves
the taking of human life.
This concession does not, however, leave such moralists speechless. For it seems to me, at least, that it is not
self-evidently true that human life itself is the most valuable thing there is, to be outweighed in value by nothing whatsoever at any time, or even, if you press the
point, that human life is intrinsically valuable- sacred,
some call it- because of its connection with all our
other values. I shall take up these points in turn, illustrating them with personal experiences lest it be thought
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that this discussion is altogether too academic and removed from the context of decision and action.
Nearly two years ago my father, a man of fifty-eight,
at the peak of his powers despite a coronary some twenty
years earlier and occasional subsequent bouts with angina, was taken ill with simple pneumonia just before
Christmas. He was at first reluctant to seek medical
attention, and when he did get an examination on the
23d of December, his case was thought not to be serious
enough to require hospitalization over Christmas. So
he was sent home where we could care for him and wait
the forty-eight hours for the antibiotics to begin taking
effect. His temperature continued to run very high, often hitting 105 degrees, and he became delirious occasionally and increasingly incapable of attending to himself in any way at all. On Christmas day the family was
sufficiently alarmed about his worsening condition to
take him by ambulance to the hospital, where he was
given some oxygen and regular treatment on an inhalator machine. Meanwhile, the family waited anxiously for the medicine to take effect, even as we watched
him lapse into what we later realized were periods of
unconsciousness. By the night of the 27th of December
it was apparent to the hospital staff that he probably
would not recover and that if he did , he would have to
undergo a long period of recuperation with no assurance at all that he would regain his former powers.
Shortly after nine o'clock family and friends joined
round his bedside as he received the Lutheran equivalent of extreme unction, and by ten o'clock he had taken
his last breath.
One great comfort to the family in our subsequent
grief was the thought that if he had lived, he probably
would never have been his former self, either in our
eyes or in his own. A subsequent, even stronger, comfort came shortly after his death, when the college to
which he had given devoted service for the last fifteen
years of his life began radically to change direction in
ways that would have caused him great pain and anxiety and disillusionment. Much as we mourn the loss of
my father, the family now sees what a blessing it was to
him, and therefore also to us, that he was spared a sad
and declining end of life, that he died relatively painlessly and attended by those who loved and respected
him.
Now it seems to me that these are either simply pious
thoughts, perhaps even rationalization to cope with grief,
or else they express a truth which is worth bearing in
mind when we face complicated moral problems like
abortion and euthanasia. That truth, simply stated, is
that life is not our highest value, and that given the
forced choice of a merciful end to life and its prolongation or continuation under decisively adverse circumstances, mapy of us would choose for ourselves and for
others its merciful end. This choice can be both rational and moral in spite of the fact that by the nature of the
case we never know with absolute certainty what a future
we deliberately foreclose might have held in store. It
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is, also, I think, a consideration which has weight whether the termination of that future involves deliberate
action, such as arranging for an abortion, or merely
passive acceptance. To be sure, the application of the
point must be done with care; it would, I think, have
been immoral for us not to have used the medical resources available to us in my father's case, even though
they proved to be unavailing. Nevertheless, remembrance of the quality of his life might well have been
appropriate had some drastic medical procedure been
proposed, such as a lung transplant, were such an operation technologically possible.
The second point is that human life is not intrinsically valuable just because it is intimately, physically,
or inextricably connected with everything else that we
regard as valuable. This realization came home to me
with some force when, some two months after my father
died, I was contemplating the floor immediately in front
of my nose in the back office of an automobile dealer's
showroom in Michigan City, Indiana, with somebody
else pointing a gun at my head and muttering little encouragements like: " If you move we'll blow your brains
out." My chief thought at the time was how very mistaken T .S. Eliot was in his false disjunction when he
says "This is how life ends, not with a bang but with a
whimper," for it seemed to me that I was about to experience quite a perfect fusion of the two possibilities. My
second thought, and the one that is more appropriate to
the present discussion, was that what made life valuable
to me up to and including that time was really a set of
very disc.-ete and particular experiences. Life itself,
considered as simply raw potentiality or empty actuality, was worth very little. I didn't so much mind the
thought of losing that; what I did mind was the thought
that I might never again have another conversation
with a friend , share a happy memory with my wife, listen to interesting music, or see my way through to the
end of an argument. Thankfully, the armed robbers
apparently valued something else more than they disvalued human life, so I was spared some more time for
the experience of these values. Incidentally, I might
add that an experience like this goes a long way toward
sorting out one's value-priorities.
In sum, human life in and of itself seems to me to be
the one value we speak of which is altogether extrinsicthat is, good as a means- whereas very many of the other valuers we have are properly considered good in themselves. When, then, it is said that abortion is immoral
just because it involves the taking of human life, I always have the feeling that the argument is incomplete,
that more must be said before the point is evident to
me. I might add that this line of thought is particularly
vexing with respect to the abortion problem, because
certainly the fetus itself does not experience any of the
values that give value to human life. Even unlike the
newborn infant, who may as yet directly experience
few values but who nevertheless is capable of bringing
the experience of value to others, the fetus's value, if
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you will, appears to lie altogether in its potential and
not at all in its present experience or in the experience
of it on the part of another- in the case, that is, of a
mother who does not want it.
You will notice that I have so far made only passing
reference to theological considerations. That is because
1 think that the moral questions of abortion have no
necessary theological dimension. In short, morality does
not essentially depend on theology, though of course
the moral views of many people, perhaps those of everyone in this room, have a significant theological component. Still less, incidentally, do I think that legality
is essentially connected with morality. This is a large
topic, and will be discussed in some detail in the final
session of this colloquium, but in closing I would sound
a note of caution against the tendency to think that one's
moral, or moral/theological, opinions should be enshrined into law, especially with respect to a matter so
complicated and variegated as that of abortion. I am all
in favor of trying every means, short of compulsion, to
get others to act as I morally or theologically think
they ought to act. Yet when reasonable people can disagree on these matters, and when, further, the problem
concerns a situation they did not directly and inten-

tionally bring about and which can be resolved without
direct consequence to any other member of society,
there is sufficient reason to be very cautious about asserting one's own judgments via law on the lives of others.
If I had to make a general response directly to Dr.
Eichhorst I support I would stress a point that I hope my
own remarks exemplify, namely that despite the plausibility of general moral premises, the properties of morality and immorality, right and wrong, attach to specific
actions by particular people. There is, as I'm sure he
would agree, a need to take the particular situations of
people into account in determining the morality of their
contemplated actions. Anything short of this careful
casuisty may itself be immoral for failing to recognize
morally relevant distinctions that need to be made.
Anything much grander than casuistry- or considering
situations on a case-by-case basis in the light of certain
general moral rules and principles- runs the risk of
misstatement. These are risks I myself may have fallen
victim to in attempting to suggest so briefly some items
for your consideration. If so, I sincerely invite you to
bring this fact to my attention, for in matters as important as these nothing but continued reflection and discussion promises to bring greater clarity to any of us.
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IN PREPARATION
july along
these last, hot weeks
a song comes, heat
crazed into being as I softly say, christmas ...
"House!" i plucked its root with the thought
"Listen!"
"I'm bringing my girl!"
my house says nothing
i know its shamed, its
grayspeckled white outside fire proof tiles
dirty and scabbed under the armpit eavesSo
mutant, gone gaunt behind a garage,
alley backed, my old house
squatting its two stories' worth on my street's thermometer end
sits as I sweat lifting ladders a siege on it
to be a paintflaked man,
eyebrows,
hair almost to Neihardt
extension corded glacier
scraped in my hand over windows and the door.
in preparation I lay it all brown
travel around
and once,
catching my wheel on a spider,
softly swore.

ANDREW GRZESKONIAK
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Welcome to our series, Light on Life. Tonight we would like to discuss the constitutional and legal ramifications of the question, "Abortion: Should the United States Constitution protect the right to choosel"
The background is the recent Supreme Court decision which pretty well demonstrates that the unborn do not
have any constitutional rights. Consequently, proposals have been made for constitutional amendments,
attempting to secure some constitutional, and therefore, legal, rights, for the unborn. We are examining
that question and really its reverse -whether the Constitution should thus be amended or whether by turning down such an amendment the Constitution would in effect be preserving the right to choose. As our
spokesmen this evening we have, first, Rabbi David Horowitz, Rabbi at Temple Bethel in Hammond, Indiana. He is here representing the Northwest Indiana Freedom of Choice Coalition. He also acts within the
Interreligious Commission on Human Equality. We also are very pleased to have with us this evening Mrs.
Jean Garton, a member of the Social Concerns Committee of the Lutheran Church -Missouri Synod. She
has spoken on this question in many forums; not least, in the sub-committee of Senator Birch Bayh, holding hearings on these human life amendments, and testifying before them. It is with a great deal of pleasure, then, that we present these two distinguished visitors to our campus community. From the introductory remarks by Walter E. Keller, chairman of the Department of Theology, Valparaiso University, Valparaiso, Indiana.

Abortion:
Should the United States Constitution Protect the Right to Choosel

DAVID M. HOROWITZ

THE QUESTION BEFORE US TONIGHT IS ONE TO
which, frankly, I'm a newcomer. I find myself in a unique
situation-standing before you speaking on the question of abortion, while simultaneously believing that
abortion is a lousy means of birth control. I really think
if we worked hard, we could find a better means of
birth control. With this thought in mind, I set the stage
for my remarks .
I'm not prepared to discuss whether one ought to
have an abortion-whether you ought to have an abortion, whether your wife ought to have an abortion,
whether or not (a little more proclamatory) your girlfriend ought to have an abortion ; that's not my purpose for speaking this evening . The presentation will
not revolve around that . The question I will limit myself

David M. Horowitz is Rabbi at Tempel Beth-El, Hammond, Indiana. He received his Master ofArts in Hebrew
Letters from the Union-College-Jewish Institute of Religion and was ordained at the same institution in 1969.
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JEAN GARTON

IT'S GOOD TO BE HERE, AND TO TALK TO
you about this subject which most people don't want to
discuss. Perhaps some of you are fans of the Peanuts
comic strip. If so, perhaps you will remember this episode of a few months ago. Charlie Brown says to Lucy,
"What's this I hear about you throwing Linus out of the
house? That's not legal you know. He's part of your family. Legally you can't throw him out." "Oh yes I can, and
I did," says crabby Lucy. "Legally a big sister can throw
out a younger brother because she's bigger than he is
and because he bugs her all the time. And she can do it
and I did it. And if you're smart, Charlie Brown, you
won't get involved." And Charlie Brown, with a big
wide-eyed look on his face, says, "Oh, I'm very smart."

Jean Garton is a member of Martin Luther Lutheran
Church, Pennsauken, New Jersey. She attended Concordia College Bronxville, New York; she received the
BA (19SO)from Ursinus College, Collegeville, Pennsylvanta.
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to is: If your girlfriend is pregnant. can she get an abortion? If your wife is pregnant. can she get an abortion?
If you are pregnant. now speaking generically, can you
get an abortion, and legally do so in the United States?
Perhaps we must spend a minute or two seeing where
we came from, where we are, and where we might be
going.
Until recently, most states of the United States had
some sort of abortion legislation . And most states still
do, in effect. have abortion legislation. Since I'm not a
lawyer, and therefore not embarrassed by the facts, I
can speak freely. These previous laws ranged from the
latest in New York which permitted abortion freely, to
state laws which prohibited abortion entirely; some
with exceptions, some without exceptions. On January
22, 1973, in a Supreme Court decision (a very lengthy
decision which we can read in toto during the discussion, if you like) the Supreme Court ruled 7-2 (two
justices dissented and wrote dissensions) in the case
Roe v. Wade, that the abortion law was unconstitutional
in Texas . It did not comply with the fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution . But the decision was lengthy,
written mostly in "legalese, " with which I have difficulty.
Now with this decision (since most abortion laws in
most states followed the pattern of the Texas law),
there were not significant differences between the
states. In effect. abortion became available to most
people in the United States. Indeed, what we had before
seemed a way of the past. The question previously was
if standard abortion was going on . Certainly abo rtion
has been with us a long time, as long as unwanted
pregnancies have been with us. I suspect the only way
to insure against unwanted pregnancy is abstinencebut I'm cynic enough to believe that we won't get to
that point very quickly.
Abortions were available to those who could leave
the country and get them legally elsewhere . Abortions
were available to those with enough guts to find an illegal abortionist in the United States. Abortion was available to those who could enlist a physician whose ethics
allowed him to bend the law, but not break and shatter
it. Abortion could be obtained by anybody with money
and the willing desire to travel to New York . Those who
could not get an abortion, by and large, were the poor
who could not afford to travel to New York or other
countries, and those who didn 't have enough guts to
go to the butcher next door. The Supreme Court decision seemingly answers this basic question .
Now, as I stand here today, the Supreme Court decision meets with a challenge, a challenge which can only
show strength in constitutional amendment. Many who
oppose abortion feel we must have such an amendment .
The question is, should the Constitution protect the
right to choose? I submit that the Constitution, by interpreting the 7-2 decision of the Supreme Court of the
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On January 22, 1973 the "crabby Lucy" philosophy became the law of the land, and we can now eliminate
those in the human family who are smaller than we are
simply because they bug us. But unlike Charlie Brown,
a growing number of people don't think it's smart toremain uninvolved when they understand why Justice
White, in his dissenting opinion, called that decision
"an exercise in raw judicial power." Our nation has not
allowed for the elimination of fetal children when their
existence is inconvenient. Our nation has had chosen
for it, by the voice and power of seven men, a social and
economic solution which takes us down that first step of
what some have called "the slippery slope of selective
extermination."
As a result we ask, should the Constitution protect the
right to choose? My response is, emphatically and definitely, yes! For in that Supreme Court decision, whole
groups of people were denied "the right to choose."
First, the electorate. The Supreme Court had the
abortion cases before it for a year and took .no action.
In November, two states brought the matter. before
their people. In Michigan, where the polls indicated the
vote would be 60 per cent in favor of abortion-on-demand, the actual vote was 62 per cent against abortionon-demand. in North Dakota, with a population only
12 per cent Roman Catholic, the vote against abortionon-demand was 78 per cent. Within a few weeks the Supreme Court gave its decision, and "the right to choose"
of those states was denied. This is one of the significant
reasons for seeking a constitutional amendment, for
through state ratification of an amendment the people
could speak in an open and democratic forum.
Secondly, taxpayers have been denied "the right to
choose." New York had a liberalized abortion law for
almost two years, and people there sought to appeal that
law. The appeal passed both legislative houses with a
greater majority than the original liberalized abortion
law, but Governor Rockefeller vetoed the appeal. One
major reason given for seeking an appeal was that, in
those few months, the liberalized abortion law cost 21.4
million dollars in federal, state, and local tax money.
In September, 1974, HEW announced that Medicaid
finances between 222,000 and 278,000 abortions each
year at the cost of 40 to 50 million dollars annually. If
an abortion decision is a private matter, why should
abortions be paid for with public money? The taxpayer
cannot claim to be a conscientious objector. He or she
pays for a process believed to be intrinsically evil, and
those who oppose abortion do not have "the right to
choose."
What "right to choose" do parents have? In many
states, minors cannot obtain an aspirin from the school
nurse without written parental permission. But in many
states minors can now get an abortion without parental
consent and, in some cases, without parental knowledge.
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United States, already protects our right to choose.
Without changing a jot or tittle, that Constitution protects the right to choose.
But let us turn to the question of constitutional
amendments. Should they be passed? Should the Constitution be changed? We have three possibilities currently before the legislature. More may come or there
may yet be changes, but now we have three possibilities. They go under the sponsors' names in the House
and/or Senate.
One is the Helms/Hogan Amendment (or Hogan/
Helms Amendment; I guess it depends on whether
you're partial to the House or the Senate). The amendment would basically give equal right under the law to
the fetus . It would basically-as now written-prohibit
abortion for any purpose. For any purpose. I have the
text and, if time allows, I'd like to read it. It would preclude abortion for any purpose. My wife could die of a
tubal pregnancy. My wife could die of a dangerous pregnancy. Or my daughter could conceivably find herself
in great mental anguish or in danger of life and have
no legal recourse under the Hogan/Helms Amendment .
The second amendment is the Buckley Amendment .
The Buckley Amendment basically protects the rights
of a life from its very conception. It differs from the
Helms/Hogan Amendment only insofar as it permits
abortion for a medical emergency, i.e., the imminent
death of the mother. It makes no provisions, however,
for mental or physical health, other than the threatening of the mother's life.
The third amendment is the Whitehearst Amendment. It is a states' rights amendment which would allow the states to pass legislation limiting or outlawing
abortion as their state legislatures deem fit . That one
doesn't sound bad on the surface. But when I live in
the state of Indiana, aware that Senator Gubbins in
Indianapolis is working full-time defining sex education
as teachers telling children they are men and women
(while anything beyond that is considered horrifying),
I have no confidence, in my heart. that the states can
write a better abortion bill than the Federal government .
THE BASIC QUESTION, THEN, IS WHETHER OR
not abortion is murder. Is it murder? If it's not murder,
then why change the Constitution? For then we are
dealing with a matter of opinion, of feeling, of sensitivity. But if abortion is murder, the question is whether
murder is ever justifiable. For justification, we could
first go very quickly through the legal killing permitted
by both church and state. Just wars are one area. A
pilot in a bomber flying over a town, knowing very well
the bombs will kill women and children as well as soldiers, nevertheless drops his bomb because that's a
just war. And we can kill to protect our freedom, liberty, God, an.d country. We can kill for self-defense, and
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However, parents must pay the abortion costs if the
minor cannot. What "right to choose" does a father have?
I know of no court case in which a father seeking to save
his child has been successful, not even the father who
made his plea-not on fatherhood, not on the unborn's
humanity, but on the contention that whatever was in
his wife's womb was at the very least community property.
What "right to choose" do medical people have? State
after state has found it necessary, because of coerced
hospitals and harassed doctors, to seek "conscience
legislation." Yet the very groups which oppose passage
of these clauses are those who claim "the right to choose."
In my own state of New Jersey, we sought a conscience
clause and it was a tough uphill battle all the way. All
of those organization who, before the Supreme Court
decision, said that no doctor or hospital should be coerced
and that everybody should have "the right· to choose,"
were the very organizations which opposed us. And
when the conscience clause was passed, they started
litigation to call it unconstitutional and now the clause
cannot be implemented Doctors in New Jersey are being harassed. We have to recognize that if someone is
given a right, then someone else must insure that right.
As a result, the women's rights are so absolute that the
rights of taxpayers, the electorate, and on down the list
have now been jeopardized.
But, of course, there's one whose "right to choose"
isn't even considered: the unborn's . He is the latest victim of our propensity for dividing humanity into human and sub-human, and the net gain determines where
that line will be drawn. "The Indian is not as human as
I"- because we wanted his land. "The Negro is not as
human as I"- because we wanted his labor. "The Jew is
not as human as I''- because we wanted racial purity.
"The unborn is not as human as 1"-why? For the same
hoped-for solutions to spatial and economic problems.
Or, in the broader picture, because we want his air, his
food , and his space!
The method used to sell abortion has been to persuade
the American public that the alternatives to legal abortion are women butchered in back alleys, a growing
number of battered (because unwanted) children, and a
pollution of society burdened down with mental and
physical defectives. The appeal is to fear.
SIX YEARS AGO IN PITTSBURGH I WAS VERY
active in a group seeking to liberalize the abortion laws.
But as my involvement grew, so did my concern for the
obvious distortion ofthe embryological facts . If the case
was true, just, and honorable, we did not need to falsify our position. We could meet those facts head-on.
But nobody wanted to talk about embryological data.
They belittled it. I had difficulty knowing that the unborn's heart begins beating at twenty-one days and
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to defend our property. We can blast a person with a
shotgun if he comes into our house, I suppose, although,
thank God, questions have been raised about that lately. All this is to examine killing, not getting hung up with
the word "kill" itself. Killing is done every day. That
doesn't justify killing, but our church and state certainly justify it in times of war and self-defense.
I'd like to present the possibility that abortion is not
murder. Therefore, any change in the Constitution of
the United States would be, not an additional aid to our
society, but a limitation of my religious freedom . A
majority of religious organizations have taken abortion
stands. I recognize, too, that a great many have kept
their mouths shut so far. So we can't count them either
way.
Is abortion murder? One tends to speak from his own
background. I will try to avoid it. but forgive me if my
examples weigh more heavily on Judaism than they
might on the United Methodist Church or another denomination I might use. In the Bible, Exodus 21 or
thereabouts (I'm a terrible quoter of verse and chapter, but if we get a Bible I can find it) is concerned with
the fetus' life in its mother's womb . From those passages and from discussions which follow, at least in
Rabbinic literature (I suspect even in Roman Catholic
literature) it can be determined whether or not the loss
of a fetus is homicide. Is it feticide? Is it. in fact. murder? Let me sum up the position from Jewish tradition
(and make a case from other traditions as well).
Jewish tradition very clearly sees that a fetus is part
of its mother. It is a tissue of the mother; it has the
mother's rights and no more rights than that. Capital
punishment does not apply to killing a fetus in Exodus
21 . It does not apply because killing a fetus is not a
capital crime . In effect. it is not murder. Damages were
collected for such injury that might cause the loss of a
fetus, but not as murder. Viewed as a loss to the family,
killing a fetus was not the crime of murder. Indeed, one
Rabbinic commentator, Rashi, writing in the fifth or
sixth century, says a person is not a person until born.
Until birth personhood is not part of him. When we
come to secondary questions of therapeutic abortion
concerning the mother's life and health (mental and
physical), Jewish tradition not only permits abortion,
but requires abortion to save her life.
I mention these examples, not to give a quick course
on Jewish theology. I mention them for this purpose:
the Hogan/Helms Amendment would abridge my religious freedom. Under the Hogan/ Helms Amendment.
I could not turn to my congregants or to my wife or to
my daughter whose life may be threatened by a tubal
pregnancy or by psychological fears that might make
them nervous wrecks or lead to suicide, and tell them
they ought to have an abortion, as my religious tradition would require me to do in such a serious case.
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doesn't stop until the moment of death; that his brain
wave pattern can be recorded at forty-three days; that
while still in the womb he can be taught; that he experiences pain and cries; that he dreams and remembers;
and even th~t he makes conscious decisions. I was stunned
to find that by five months he can distinguish the voice
of his mother from others around him. But my uneasiness grew when we were taught to speak the "right"
language: never give any humanity to the unborn child;
never talk about him as a child or a baby; always speak
of "the product of conception," "the abortus," or "mass
of tissue"; always talk about "terminating a pregnancy,"
as if it were a victimless procedure.
But I think what really finally got to me was the sentence, "A woman should have the right to control her
own body." I'm a feminist, and I endorse that concept.
But in this context I did not believe there was valid use
of that concept. Without the placenta, which never exists
in a woman until the child puts it there, the child would
be rejected as foreign tissue. And then I thought of my
own children and wondered, How can this be my body?
Two children I carried are boys. Can one body be both
male and female simultaneously? Two of my children
have blood differing in type and factor from mine. Can
two blood types be compatible in one body simultaneously? And what of the child who died while I carried him?
Can one body be alive and dead simultaneously? By
any reasonable biological standard, abortion destroys
a separate human body.
At the same time my involvement in the women's
movement grew. And I soon found I was a far more
radical feminist than most of the group. It was inconsistent that after years of pleading for a voice, demanding equality and self-determination, and protesting being viewed as objects to be cast off when inconvenient,
that when we finally achieved a voice we used it to demand that another whole segment of the human family
be viewed as objects to be discarded when inconvenient.
And being discarded were females- the most helpless
and innocent of females -little women whom rhetoric
defined out of existence. I believe women deserve more
than a lunch-hour procedure exposing them to immediate and long-range dangers. I believe women deserve
more than death to their offspring as solutions to their
problems. And I have come to believe th,at abortion is
the ultimate exploitation of women . What is promoted
as freedom and liberation is really promotion of a distinctly mas0lline form of aggression and selfishness.
When you talk about "the right to choose," what about
that woman herself? Does she really have a choice, when
insurance companies pay for the abortion of a single
woman but don't pay the cost of a delivery? Does she
really have a choice when the new adoption laws require
her to identify the father who must give written permission for adoption; and if she can't or won't identify him,
17
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Even among orthodox Jewry, and even among orthodox
rabbis who would tell you abortion is an absolutely
terrible thing to perform, they would also have to say
that. based on literature written three or four years
ago by the chief rabbi of Israel. mental anguish is reason
enough to justify, perhaps require, abortion . Judaism
and other religious sensibilities would certainly condone abortion as a remedy in a rape case (indeed we are
taught that to uproot a seed illegally sown is perfectly
permissible). The law now enables one to obtain an
abortion as legally and safely as any surgical process;
any change in this law I find to be an absolute abridgment of my religious right. my civil rights, my personal
rights.
When one speaks on abortion to women, one feels
like a male gynecologist telling a woman what birth is
like. I've never had a baby and I've never had an abortion and I've never gone through the pangs of an abortion in my own family. I have, obviously, with those I
counsel. I do not like abortion as a remedy. I do not like
abortion as a practice. I would argue that the law now
standing is often abused . But I stopped to buy a pack of
cigarettes on the way here and noticed that the Surgeon General told me that smoking is injurious to my
health . I would fight any law that made cigarette manufacturing illegal. I would fight any law not protecting my
right to choose . I think the seatbelt law in the United
States is horrendous. If I want to kill myself by going
through a windshield, let me kill myself by going through
a windshield . Don't put me in danger of not starting my
car quickly.
The essential point I'm making is that I would not
support. and would fight strongly against. any law that
said ( 1) a deformed child must be aborted, (2) a mongoloid child must be aborted, or (3) a woman who has
seventeen kids must abort her eighteenth. I would argue against such laws just as vehemently as I argue
against any change in the Constitution limiting abortion
rights. I would fight against it for the same reasons I
would not force anybody to an abortionist. I would not
force anybody to violate religious or medical feelings;
doctors who do not wish to perform abortions should
not; women who feel they cannot have an abortion
should not.
I am very satisfied with the law of the United States
of America . I am very satisfied with the Constitution of
the United States that says I do not have to take my
wife for an abortion . I don't have to take my daughter
for an abortion. I may choose whether I believe abortion is murder or whether I wish to subject somebody
to it.
I will conclude. There are lists upon lists upon lists
of organizations on both sides of the abortion issue. I
study them, not because numbers make correctness.
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she must consign her child to institutional care? Do we
really give that woman a choice when, by giving birth,
she knows her child carries a lifelong record stamped
"illegitimate"? If it's less expensive to have an abortion,
and if laws oppress her from giving birth to her child,
are we really giving her a choice?
Nations, like individuals, define themselves by choices.
A choice has been made for us by seven men. But that
choice does not stand alone. Abortion does not exist in
a vacuum. Before his death Rev. Niemoeller, a German
Lutheran clergyman during the Nazi era, wrote: "They
came after the Jews, but I wasn't a Jew so I didn't protest. They came after the Catholics, but I wasn't a Catholic so I didn't protest. They came after the labor unions,
and I wasn't a member so I didn't protest. Then they
came after me, but no one was left to protest." If we
don't protest now the elimination of innocent, defenseless lives for social expediency and economic utilitarianism, then we had better have an iron-clad guarantee
that we will always be wanted, productive, privileged,
and perfect. Or else, like the unborn, we may find ourselves without a defense, without a voice, and without
achoice.
f
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I know that if the whole world decided to burn down
Valparaiso University, the president of Valparaiso University would be unhappy. Might alone does not make
right. I will not read the list in toto, nor do I use it for
numbers. I use it to show that enough doubt exists about
whether we are dealing with murder or homicide, or
whether abortion is justifiable if it is homicide. Tampering with the laws of the United States would be greatly
unjust to the majority of its people. Legal organizations
listed in favor of the right to choose are the American
Bar Association, the Civil Liberties Union, and a few
others. Of national legal organizations none has verbally taken a position against the right to choose . Only
eight medical organizations have taken opposition positions: the American Association of Pro-Life Obstetricians and Gynecologists; the California Medical Association; Catholic Hospitals Association Worldwide; Doctors and Nurses Against Abortion; Doctors and Nurses
for Life; and Sciences for Life. The following organizations have all taken positions favoring free choice: the
American Association for Planned Parenthood; the
American College of Obstetricians; the American College of Osteopathic Obstetricians; the American Medical Association; eta/. (quite a list).
I skip to religious organizations because I feel the
fight should be fought there, not in the country's courts
and legislatures. Ten organizations have publicly favored
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changing the law, favor stripping the right to choose:
the Cardinum and Denby Foundation; Preachers Against
Abortion; Preaching Crusade; Lutheran Synod; National Board for Social Concerns of the Lutheran
Church; Rabbinical Council of America; Roman Catholic Conference of Bishops; Society for the Christian
Commonwealth; Roman Catholic Church; and the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. I hold up

the other side just to show you the pro right-to-choose
list.
I don't want to take away my religious freedom and
yours over the abortion question. I do not believe it is
murder. I'd be glad to go into sources and reasoning
during the discussion. I end with hope for a happy medium, that those who do not wish abortion are not
forced to it.

!J

DISCUSSION

Question.
Rabbi Horowitz, you said at the end, "the choice to decide if abortion is murder." If you have already decided
that abortion is murder, then wouldn't you, in good conscience, be compelled to oppose abortiont It becomes morally indefensible to allow the right to murder, given that situation.
Horowitz. I understand. Let me just rephrase it. If one is convinced a murder is going to take place, can one sit by and
allow laws to permit that murder to take place? The obvious answer to that question is no, of course not; we can't condone murder. However, having said that, let me say that I, for one, do not believe it murder. I, for one, can find many
others far more educated, both theologically and medically, than I, who would also say it is not murder. Senator·Hatfield made a very beautiful speech, saying, "If we're going to err, let us err on the side of caution," which sounds very
exciting. Maybe it's not murder, but we'll err on the side of caution. Saying that, however, he shuts the door to some
religious groups' demands. Unanimity does not exist in the medical profession nor, obviously, in the theological realm,
and apparently not in the legal realm, for the Supreme Court and the majority decision basically said that it could not
decide questions that theologians and doctors could also not decide, i.e., when is life? Is it murder? etc. A step further
would say, because I feel it to be murder, I will pass a constitutional amendment that will make my definition of murder the definition of murder. I cannot live with that kind of approach.
Question.
I understand your argument to be that legislating against abortion would oppose American free choice. As the
Constitution now stands, this freedom is given to the states. Is this correctt
Horowitz.

It is the Supreme Court's decision that we are free to choose. To choose what is the question, of course.

Question.
I find that right now the Constitution limits choice for the sake of preservation and dignity of human life. How
can you say that a constitutional amendment which limits the right to choose destroys the unborn American against the
freedom of choice now stated in the Constitution"f
Horowitz. I think we're dealing in definitions. You are defining (as the court did not define) the fetus as an entity with
legal, moral, and actual rights. That's the question it really boils down to: Is the fetus a human being? Is the fetus an
entity with rights, legal, moral, or any other? I think I can make a case out of at least two religious traditions, by the
same phrase which Mrs. Garton just used: an "eight-month baby," "an eight-month child." That phrase has no place,
frankly, in Jewish tradition. A child is not a child, even to be buried with ceremony, until after birth. Indeed, not a
child to be buried, in terms of traditional Jewish burial rituals, until perhaps thirty days after birth. So we're dealing
with definitions: do we have a person, whose rights are being abridged under the law? I do not believe we are dealing
with a person, but rather with a potential life. And that potential life is serious. Prenatal care should certainly be a
part of a pregnant woman's life, because she deals with potential life. In her doctor's medical opinion, an abortion
might be necessary to her life. Ensoulment is a theological argument dealing with this potential life. I'd be glad to
argue ensoulment. I enjoy a theological discussion much more than I enjoy a legal discussion. "Ensoulment," "life,"
"potential life"- I don't believe definitions for them are clear. And I don't believe that any definition- in terms of a
right to choose and in terms of my own religious dictates- would be made illegal by such legislation.
Question.
Rabbi Horowitz, why do you say the unborn child does not have any rightst Is it because you cannot see him,
touch him, look him in the eye, feed him, or anything like thaH Suppose he does have rights -does that give you the right
to impose your religious choice on himt
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Horowitz. First, no. My basis for saying that the fetus has no rights is not that I can't see him, for indeed, I can't see
him. I could use proper X-ray equipment at certain times during pregnancy when it wouldn't harm the fetus, to show
me a fetus quite clearly. I could even do surgery, tap the amniotic fluid, or someday be able to do intra-uterine surgery, and then be able to touch the fetus itself. So, no, it's not based on the fact that I can't see it, touch it, feed it, etc.
I ask the theological question of when life begins. When is ensoulment? When are there rights to that fetal life? It has
nothing to do with whether I can see it or not see it. It's based on something far beyond that.
Now the second part of your question. Again, obviously my answer should be no. If the fetus has rights, then I
shouldn't impose my religion and take the fetus' life. I suspect that's the question's intent. There is a case-you'll forgive me for using examples from Judaism- known as the rodef (translated literally as "pursuer"). Almost all legal
systems provide for justifiable homicide, whatever that term may mean, to eliminate the life of a pursuer. If I chase
you to kill you, then indeed I can be stopped on the basis of defense. Where the mother's life is threatened, we talk
about definition of life. I am not content to define life as whether or not the mother comes out breathing. I think more
involves life in physical and mental health. But in the case of the pursuer, I want the opportunity to take action against
the pursuer. In this case, I see the pursuer as the fetus. So therefore not only do I talk about my religious beliefs imposed upon the fetus, I also talk about right to life for an individual involved in a pregnancy.
Now we can deal with the Buckley Amendment which theoretically gives as a loophole the right to protect the mother's life. I am not satisfied; I am not satisfied with pending legislation. All of these amendments carry the clause (I
don't remember the exact wording) "the various and sundry states shall be empowered to enact legislation to implement this amendment." I am not at all convinced that those states will not define away the concept of life as I see it.
I am more willing to put my trust in the medical profession (as misplaced as that trust often is), I am more willing to
put that trust into my own and my wife's judgments, than I am in the legislations of fifty states.
Question.
What if it comes down to a choice of whether you're going to save the mother's life or the unborn's lifet You
seem to say that I must choose the mother's life.
Horowitz.
Question.

I don't think there is a choice in my religious tradition.
But what about choosing that the child live rather than the motherl

Horowitz. The basis for that argument is the question of salvation for the embryo. I've done a lot of reading in church
documents in the last few months. I find them almost as incomprehensible as I find "legalese." The question boils
down too often to the salvation question. For example, a mother's life/child's life choice might very well tell us a
mother has been baptized, has gone through various sacraments, and so on, and therefore eternity may be very well
for her. However, a child, having an unbaptized soul, may very well die in an abortion or spontaneous abortion and
therefore be damned because of no Baptism. That is a religious argument, not a legal argument. Because of my tradition and many traditions, including the position of the early Roman Catholic Church, I do not posit the eternal soul
of a fetus, and, indeed, question whether that fetus has a soul. If that decision must be made, you yourself make that
decision. You help your wife make it. Let me decide it with my wife.
Question.
Rabbi Horowitz, twice I have listened to Rabbi Tannenbaum, and in his pro-life stance he was very emphatic
about the Jewish tradition. He respects every man's life, including the unborn's. He especially talked about Genesis and
every man being made in God's image and likeness. According to Judaism's sacred books, life in a womb is sacred and God
is present there. He emphatically stated that if you protect one human being's life, you protect all men's lives. He emphasized standing for the poor, the hungry, the discriminated, the Jews in Russia, but was very willing to begin that respect
for life with the unborn, beginning with conception. He said this was Jewish tradition, and didn't see it any other way. Tonight you seem to be saying the opposite.
Horowitz. I'm glad you raised that. I agree with everything Rabbi Tannenbaum says, and I've read much of his literature. I'd respond to you by saying that in available literature from the Talmud and the Bible and in modern literature, the position is clear. Rabbi Untermann, who took a position against abortion and who wrote the last recognized
work in the area, concludes: (1) The life of a mother is not questioned. The mission requires that her life be saved.
(2) He is willing to extend this into severe medical questions (but he himself would not define what a severe medical
question was). (3) Though pushed into the problem of mental health, abortions are to be allowed "where you can determine suicidal tendencies that might come as a result of a pregnancy." Again, he was unwilling to define where that
point of "suicidal tendencies" enters. So I agree with Rabbi Tannenbaum's reverence for life. If I were arguing a strictly Jewish position, I would say that every consideration must be given to what I think is a very serious procedure affecting future life. That should be protected.
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Question.
Mrs. Garton, I have never heard the point made about abortion being exploitation of women. Would you say
more about thaH
Garton. First, money is made off women's bodies. This has always been true. We see that in England, for instance, if
one doctor is paid the same amount of money as another, 95 per cent refuse to do abortions because they don't make
any money from it and because it's not within their concept of medicine. Here, however, because of the dropping birth
rate we see more and more doctors performing abortions. Stock in suction abortion machines doubled within three
days of the Supreme Court decision. Upjohn, which is introducing a drug effective for aborting four to six-month
fetuses, announced that it had taken fifteen years of untold manpower hours plus 30 million dollars to perfect it.
They've got to recoup that, and it won't be on men's bodies.
Playboy carried an article (I think in its January, 1974 issue) about how much money had been put into the abortion
movement and how much legal information had been provided through their education fund. I am convinced that
many people talk about trying to help women, but indeed talk about trying to line their own pockets. And in that
sense, I meant abortion exploits women.
Question.
Don't you think that even before abortion was legal, when the situation warrants, you'll always find people who
line their pocketsl
Garton.

Yes.

Question.

•

Do you stand totally against legalization of abortion or just against a modification of the lawsl

Garton. Legislation should remove existing pressures. As to my abortion stand, I have moved back and back and back.
I am now at the point where I would support a constitutional amendment that allows for abortion only to prevent the
mother's death. Rape loopholes are appealing, except that they provide an extremely big loophole.
In Pittsburgh there is a very well-known abortionist. You may have seen him on the "Today" show. He's one of the
doctors who went to Bangladesh and aborted the women who had been raped. He just did an abortion that delivered
an eight-month-old baby (three pounds, one ounce) who lived. But he refused it any kind of life-support. The doctor
let the baby die. He allowed no one to help it even though it kicked and it breathed. They had photographed him
doing the abortion because he was being funded. He received $479,000 to experiment on women while aborting them.
This was filmed but he didn't care because he felt he had no worry. The law said he could abort. Well, it turns out a
problem developed and he left the country. The district attorney subpoenaed the film.
My point is that a rape exclusion or exception leaves a very, very big loophole. So does a defective child clause.
We have no way of knowing whether a child is defective, even using amniotic fluid tests. The test itself may cause
defectiveness, and it doesn't measure the degree of defectiveness. So I would support no loopholes except to save the
mother's life. There may be times I would allow for an abortion. Right now I can't say, well, for rape or for this. But
I hope that the law would then subject any abortion to due process. We have laws that say you cannot kill anyone. If
you hit somebody with your car or if you've killed them in self-defense, that must go through the legal system.
Question.

Could modifications be amended by time factorsl

Garton. Most abortions are not done before eight weeks. They have found that complications during that time are extremely high. So if we say that all that is being aborted during the first eight weeks is a fertilized egg, that is a situation which does not exist. The fetus must be sufficiently large since the womb penetrates so easily and the woman
might need a hysterectomy to stop hemorrhaging. Abortions are rarely done before eight weeks. There's no way we
could abort during the first week. So there we are, at eight weeks, with a fetus that has a beating heart and brain waves,
moves, experiences pain. I could not justify abortion at two months any more than I could at eight months simply
because the fetus is less developed.
Question.
I'd like to make two comments and then ask a question. First, calling. abortion a means of contraception is incorrect. Contraception prevents pregnancy, whereas abortion destroys life already begun. Talking about abortions for women
pregnant only a few days is ridiculous. Usually a woman does not realize she's pregnant until after six weeks. This is the
first time when a urinalysis can really be judged correctly-at six weeks. Whether there are problem pregnancies or not,
eight out of ten women reject their pregnancies in the first three months. There's a very good reason for this. During the
first three months of pregnancy, the woman's hormonal system changes radically. Consequently, many women during the
first three months turn moody and their emotions really come into play. But as time goes on, the hormonal system seems
to balance out.
Secondly, in response to the idea of abortions solving mental anguish or mental disease, no mental condition will be cured
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by abortion. And now, my question: Mrs. Garton, in the earlier part of this century, several groups convinced legislators
that banning alcohol sales would legislate people's morals and many problems would be solved. It didn't work. I'm wondering whether abortion is a moral problem, and if it is, can you cite an example where legislation would help solve our moral
problemsf

I would relate the alcohol issue to the pack of cigarettes Rabbi Horowitz told of. If you personally choose to
smoke or drink, fine. But I would go back further in history to the Supreme Court's decision of 7-2 which declared the
black man not to be a person by constitutional meaning. I believe the issue in this decision involves a victim. It's not
that the woman decides and it affects no one else. Someone else is at stake. As for legislating morals, all our laws base
themselves on somebody's moral code. But we're talking about protecting another life. And that's different from alcohol.

Garton.

Question.
Legislating abortion may result in mothers' lives being jeopardized by going to "butchers.'' If you're concerned
about taking care of people's lives, how do you deal with thaH

Fortunately we have a history to deal with. No country has experienced a decline, in the long run, of illegal
abortions. The initial impact after legislation is decline, but the figure immediately rises. So we are not guaranteed
that we will eliminate illegal abortions. Women will always at some time want privacy. And if you go to a clinic or a
hospital, it's written down somewhere. There will always be those who go to the neighborhood abortionist, even if
they could go to a legal abortionist.

Garton.

Question.

Why legislate thenf If the same number of people will go to an illegal abortionist, why introduce legislationf

Because we will protect that many more of the victims. Using your philosophy, we might say there is $10 million in merchandise shoplifted daily. Therefore, since people will shoplift and so much is taken, and because 50 per
cent of the teenagers arrested claim they don't see anything wrong with it, shoplifting should be legalized. Simply because people will do things that are wrong is not a reason to legalize it. Legally we're killing innocent people.

Garton.

Question.
If you are concerned about the people, I can't see how legislation can help. What seems most crucial is the mother's safety.

Perhaps you assume that legal abortions are safe. The complications from legal abortion are mounting. People
think that if it's done in a hospital by a doctor there are no complications. That's not so. The complications recorded
are immediate ones of hemorrhage and infection, but long-range physical and emotional complications are very, very
senous.

Garton.

Question.

The most conservative Supreme Court in the history of the United States passed this abortion legislation. Whyf

In reading the Supreme Court decision, which took a long time, an idea came to me. Obviously I can't speak
for any one of the justices (they spoke for themselves in the decisions), but the decision was based primarily on the
fourteenth Amendment-the right to privacy, the right to control one's body. Now we've heard rights being bandied
back and forth. Whose rights are we stepping on? I share sympathy with Mrs. Garton for those doctors who apparently
are pressured to perform abortions. Their rights ought to be protected also. I suspect, however, that most of you would
not agree with me if I said the United States ought to pass a law saying all clergymen should do marriages for people
only within their own denomination. I use this example because I'm under enormous pressure in the Jewish community to perform intermarriage ceremonies, and this has become a difficult question. Every day I've got several requests
from good congregants, who pay my salary, that I ignore my religious dictates. I'd love a law that would say I can't
do it, and courts which would say I can't do it. I really believe this conservative Supreme Court acted very much in
line with strict conservative constructionism. They were interpreting constitutionality and reached a decision they
felt was within the meaning of the Constitution's language.

Horowitz.

Your question was why such a conservative court reached this opinion. Three days after the decision Harry
Blackmun spoke to Sioux City's Chamber of Commerce, where reporters asked him what he thought of the decision.
He said, "Oh, I really wish I'd had more time to think about it. I wish I could have put my feet up on the desk and
really spent more time on it." He'd had up to fourteen months. Another reason a conservative court came out with this
decision had nothing to do with being conservative. In the decision there are statements like "in the face of overpopulation," or "considering the burden of unwanted children." I think the justices reacted to the same fears which
exist in society today. They saw a solution to social and economic problems. It had nothing to do with a conservative
court. I would have to disagree that they were strict constructionists. The Fourteenth Amendment dates from 1868.

Garton.
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Let's back up a little from 1868. New facts about human conception had just been found and medical society pressured
legislators to protect that new life. As a result, strong anti-abortion laws went on the books.
In 1866, the same people who endorsed the Fourteenth Amendment passed an expanded assimilative crimes act
which endorsed all the anti-abortion laws. No word or act in history indicates that those who framed the amendment,
or the Congress which proposed it, or the states which endorsed it ever intended that amendment to provide, under
right to privacy, the right to terminate a pregnancy.
On the other hand, regarding the unborn, Justice Blackmun's sources were very much the same used with the Supreme Court's 7-2 decision in the Dred Scott case of 1857. In that decision they said that since the black man, a hundred years earlier, was not considered a person, they also didn't consider him a person. Now Blackmun has said, "Two
hundred years ago when the constitution was written they didn't consider the unborn a person." Nowhere in therecent decision did they ask whether embryological information of recent years might not compel the court to review its
definition of person. So in that sense they are strict constructionists, but under rights of privacy they are evolutionists. It's an inconsistent way of presenting a decision.
Question.
Very recently, an administration representative pleaded with the Senate Hearing Committee to grant more people
free abortions for the stated purpose~ot moral reasons-of giving the medical profession abortion practice. Mrs. Garton
mentioned that if we are so wise, we must look at those people whom we consider less than human. We are dealing with the
poor in this country, who apparently are not considered worthy of carrying on their lives. Would you like to respond to than

Medicaid pays for all sorts of elective surgery. Medicaid may have all sorts of problems as a legal piece of
legislation. That Medicaid is also paying, according to the statistics, 220,000 abortions this year does not automatically
upset me. My tax dollars go to many things I personally find abhorrent. During recent years, the Vietnam war was
probably the highest of those things. It pained me every time I filled out a tax return. So in this sense I do not find
it difficult to accept that the only people we have previously precluded from abortion possibilities have been those
who couldn't afford it. I think that abridges more civil rights and liberties than some other civil rights and liberties
which may be abridged. I don't see a direct connection in what you're saying, because we're dealing again with definitions- the definition of life, of ensoulment, and all sorts of complicated things. DNA is the source of life. We brush
more DNA off our teeth every day than is done in an abortion. Even having said that, I find abortion to be a serious
step, according to my religious tradition. I do not consider abortion murder, but there certainly is a life potential that
I don't wish to discard without thought.
.U

Horowitz.

IN A SUMMER PARK THE BOYS FIELD
In a summer park the boys field
large red round playground balls
Kicked
o so far
preceded by pleas,
Give us a high one!
Over and over the ball plummets through waiting arms,
never quite closed
over and over the cry,
Give us a high one!
The girls forgot their jacks
so they say they gots nothing to play.
But the openarmed boys chase and all afternoon
embrace the air
gonna catch one any minute, now . ..
the song endless as their hope:
Give us a high one!
ANDREW GRZESKOWIAK

June, 1975
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The Shape of the Christian Family

Ralph and Linda Long

Two assumptions underlie the request of the editor for Christian families to write about their own families: (1) the models by which Christians shape their families are getting rarer, while alternate (and not so satisfactory) alternates are pressed on every side; (2) Christian families can learn about family life from each
other. One avenue for mutual learning and teaching is to have Christian families describe their own families. Authors are invited from various age and economic levels, from different professions, and from various family situations. Some people will be invited who have chosen to remain single.
The subject is the family, not merely individual members in it. The invitation is to describe the foundations for their fidelity and Jove, to discuss the ways pressures are met and the Christian life is nurtured,
and to express the fears and hopes for the future of the Christian family. The Cresset will be pleased to
play even a small part in arresting the disintegration of family life by assisting in its reconstruction. -KFK

WRITING ABOUT OUR FAMily is risky. We hesitate to trumpet
our ideals because we so often fall
short of them. We are reluctant to
preserve our faults on paper because
we are striving to mend them. Our
feelings range frorri wanting to share
our experiences to an urge to protect our privacy. The dynamic forces
of the day-to-day living in our family are difficult to shape on paper.
Becoming is the thrust of our family. Our nuclear unit centers around
respect for one another. Each of us
is finding his own interests and
abilities. In our family it means that
Linda becomes a law student after
eleven years of being wife, mother,
and musician. Ralph studies accounting and reads. Alan struggles with
beginning violin lessons and magic.
Philip explores sports announcing
and math games. Each member is
excited by the others' growth. In
this situation, the parents respect
the children as people, rather than
as puppets or property. The boys
recognize the personhood of the par-

Ralph E. Long (BA, Valparaiso University, 1964) and Linda Landeck
Long (BA, Valparaiso University,
1974, and presently a student in the
School of Law at Valparaiso University) wer-e married in 1963. Their
sons, Alan (fifth grade) and Philip
(fourth grade) joined them in the
discussions in preparation for this
paper.
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ents rather than taking after-school
transportation or grocery-shopping
chores for granted.
Openness and sharing with one
another are essential. Discussions
about kicked shins, the excitement
of an Indiana school project, aspects of fraud , or a man without a
home are part of the supper ritual.
In our family we learn about the
feelings of each of us and how to
cope with them. We're discovering
bit-by-bit who we are and what we
can become. Yet the introspection
and sharing is balanced with respect
for the privacy that each of us requires.
Alan and Philip share an occasional lecture or an afternoon at the Art
Institute in Chicago with their parents. Other times the parents share
the spontaneity of a boistrous waterfight or the fantasy of Disneyland.
Doing lots of things together has led
us from court watching, to a Cubs
game, to Illinois archeology.
Our family is openly affectionate
to one another. Hugs and kisses are
exchanged- even between brothers
on occasion! We aren't afraid to say
"I need a hug." Each of us is still
developing a self-concept of sexuality, even father and mother. Our
manhood and womanhood do not
hinge on the livelihood of a man or
the proportions of a woman's figure.
A man can be tender; a woman can
lift a shovel full of dirt.
Family is a microcosm, We are a
mini-church which shares the love,

needs the forgiveness, and grapples
with the tensions of trying to be little Christs. Learning to relate to one
another in the family teaches us to
live with others in school or where
we work. On the other hand, our
family is often a haven where one is
accepted in spite of his faults, especially times when it seems that the
rest of the world rejects us.
In the family we are free . . . free
to practice the values we hope for in
the world. We can choose to use shaving soap instead of aerosols, to use
leftovers from the refrigerator instead of letting them spoil, to limit
faddish purchases, to use goods until they are worn out or to give them
away, to limit the size of our family,
to put career, money, and material
goods into a perspective that places
other people and self-worth first.
Coping with change is part of the
dynamic of becoming. Change is a
struggle between wanting to stay
with the soft, warm comfortableness
of the familiar and wanting to emerge
into the excitement of the new and
unexperienced. The familiar flashes
back during the emergence. The
parents watch the boys grow more
individualistic and more independent. As parents we try to live our
own lives, not project our goals onto the children. The boys realize that
they will change, that they are becoming more independent, yet they
feel the need for boundaries. They
accept and understand·the rationale
for the rules.
The Cresset

OUR FAMILY'S SELF-CONcept, like that of most families, originated in the events, ideas, and
values of the two nuclear families of
the parents. It has grown like every
other family from the impact of
world events, our education, societal
trends, and the people we have
known along the way.
The family of the Longs is also
planted in our faith. In the context
of Christ we seek to remember that
our value is God-given. That is reflected in the way the boys express
their feelings about God and worship. "God is someone to talk to.
You can just tell Him about your
day. He doesn't treat us like puppets,
moving our arms with strings. We
have a choice." Worship happens
every day. It is out on the playground or in the bank. It is churches
and people and communion and
sharing. It is acting out parables, a
service with clowns at the University chapel, or reading the Bible
like poetry.
Living with years of chronic illness also taught us about family.
For eight years we thought we did
not have a future as a family, expecting to be without a father. Needs of
the family required that Linda be
more than wife and mother. She
tried to become chauffeur, emotional
mainstay, carpenter, nurse, whatever was needed.
Alan and Philip lived with the unnamed fears of their parents' anxieties. The four of us talked about
death, of remarriage, of funerals ,
of new beginnings, of the boys' fears
that they too might get the same
disease their father has.
Other families enrich our family.
The boys brought back their experiences from the six months they
lived with three families during
their father's hospitalizations out of
town. Water skiing, late night hours,
more brothers and sisters, family
singing and family praying broadened their concepts of family structure and ideals. It gave all of us new
insight into our own family .
After Ralph's year of hemodialysis and then a successful kidney
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transplant from his mother, the
reality of resurrection set off a number of profound changes. The family
had gone through the death ritual
when Ralph was close to death. Because his death was so expected, the
new life became a let-down to all of
us, and feeling let-down made us
guilty. After all , our prayers had
been answered. The swirling mixture of joy and guilt, love and rejection, hope and yet fear was intense.
Then we began to change. Ralph
transformed his self-concept from
invalid to whole man, from unemployable to productive. Linda relinquished roles she had assumed. She
found herself with time and energy
to consider what would satisfy her
restlessness. Alan and Philip changed
their expectations of a father from
one sick and very limited, to a father
with whom to fish and play baseball.
We began cautiously to plan for the
future, something that we had not
done before.
So we have never been a family
patterned after traditional roles of
wife/husband or parents/children.
In the days of illness the boys often
assisted with their father's care.
Mother often changed the oil in the
car or built bookshelves. Father
cooked because that was the energy
he could contribute to the family.
The illness was a blessing in that
we have learned. We do tasks because they need to be done, not because they fit roles. The housework
is shared. No one wants to do it, so
we all participate as part of our function as family . Linda works the garden because she enjoys it. Ralph and
the boys cook flaming French dishes
because they enjoy the creativity.
The boys vacuum because they can
do it well.
Freedom from the idea that there
are things that women do and things
that men do have given our family
the flexibility that allows Linda four
years in school. Alan and Philip
have the satisfaction of knowing
ways to care for themselves, and
of knowing how much the family
needs their contributions. The freedom from societal stereotypes is
winning us "human liberation."

CONFLICTS WITH OUR FAMily concept come from many directions. TV commercials of mothers
who find ectasy in waxed floors , or
well-entrenched value systems of
relatives and friends, or subtle pressure from the Lutheran tradition of
family are constantly challenging
our model. Pressure of too little time
to do all we want and the resulting
difficulties with priorities leads to
repeated reassessment of what our
values in the family are.
We still have many areas where we
grope for direction. Handling our
differences is one of those. Rationally talking them through to resolution is the ideal. Being angry, sulking, or jealous without being destructive to people is yet to come.
As husband and wife we are still
searching for the balance of friendships for each of us outside the marriage. Our friendship and commitment to each other is ready to take
the growth of adding other close relationships. But we have yet to learn
how to blend that with the family
models and lifestyles of others.
Admitting past mistakes and talking about them and why they happen is one answer. Our hope is that
understanding will lead to forgiveness and a bridge to new growing.
The future has new meaning for us .
Every day of continued health is a
gift. We think we are equipped to
handle chronic illness if and when it
comes again, but with different
values and priorities than in the
past. We are different people. We
know that we can rely on God and
one another. But our focus is upon
living each day to the fullest.
We talk often about butterflies ...
how they start out crawling and grow
into something that flies . .. how the
world (and our problems) must look
entirely different from the air than
from the ground ... how the butterfly is a symbol both of Christ's resurrection and our own change in outlook ... how something that might
think it is ugly can result in something beautiful ... how the butterfly symbolizes our hope, our becoming.
.U
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The Skill of Sight-Singing

Gordon Brock

_IN LEARNING TO READ THE LANGUAGE OF
words, sentences, and paragraphs, a person must acquire
certain tools with which he is able to read and understand words in arrangements that he has not seen before. Parents and educators would be amiss to accept the
learning of individual poems and essays without also
learning the notation of words, sentences, and paragraphs. If this procedure were allowed, only those individual pieces of literature would be learned; no means
would be gained by which to read new literature.
This incredible procedure is, however, tolerated in
the teaching of vocal music. Students learn individual
songs and choral compositions without learning to understand meter signatures, rhythmic notation, key signatures, pitch notation, clefs, and intervals. Because
students do not learn these basic structural elements of
music, and do not learn to reproduce the sounds that
they represent, they are unable to sing at sight compositions other than those which they have heard or sung
previously.
The presence of vocal music in most educational institutions indicates that there is a general acceptance of
its value. This value would be more fully realized if one
learned to sing at sight, rather than by rote. One would

Gordon Brock, Visiting Instructor in Music at Valparaiso University, received his BM from Calvin College,
Grand Rapids, Michigan, and his MM from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He has taught sight
singing at the University of Wiscon sin-Madison, at a
workshop for South American choral conductors in
Caracas, Venezuela, and at Valparaiso University.
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then have a tool with which to explore music which
he has not encountered before.
In choral rehearsals at any educational level, the time
that it takes to learn by rote the notes of a composition
is subtracted from the time that could be spent in musical, rather than mechanical ventures. If the members of
a choir could sight-sing, the time could be spent analyzing and further understanding the music; literature
could be examined and compared to other literature;
harmony, rhythm, phrase structure, text setting, form,
and other musical elements could be studied and understood. Individual musicianship could be built during
the time that would otherwise be used for the rote learning of notes. If all these musical components are taught
in choral rehearsals, it is usually at the expense of the
performance level or the .amount and variety of literature studied.
The amount of literature that students are exposed to
is only a tiny portion of all the literature that is available to them. The rhythmically intricate music of the
middle ages is almost never performed. Renaissance
compositions that are not transliterated to familiar clefs
are seldom touched. These situations are a result of not
learning to sight-sing.
In the same way, music that is not written within the
bounds of traditional harmonic idioms is largely ignored. Music by composers such as Arnold Schoenberg,
Kenneth Gaburo, Krystof Penderecki, and George
Rochberg is seldom performed, simply because inability to sight-sing makes it necessary to learn such music
by rote. This consumes far too much rehearsal time.
Before sight-singing is accepted as an important part
of each child's education, there must be increased understanding of each human being's capabilities relative to
music. If a person is able to sing a hymn, a song from the
radio, or a television commercial ditty, then he has
proved himself capable of hearing and reproducing
pitches and rhythms. The task of learning to sight-sing
then, is developing this ability and learning the notation of these pitches and rhythms. If a person has
achieved fluency in the reading of words, then he has
mastered a notational system more complex than that
required to sight-sing. If a person has achieved fluency
in the mathematical processes of multiplication and
division, then he has mastered the basic mathematical
processes necessary to sight-sing.
There are people, though, who will insist that they
"don't have rhythm" or that they "can't carry a tune."
Perhaps this is true, although thus far in the musical
life of this writer (granted, this is not enough exposure
from which to make any universal statements), it has
never been true . This writer has yet to find a child or
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adult (except those who are deaf, dumb, mentally retarded, or emotionally retarded) who could not be taught
to hear and reproduce pitches and rhythms. Those who
insisted that they possessed these inabilities had previously lacked either the willingness or the opportunity
to discover their abilities.
Discussions with and writings of other music educators confirm the conclusion that there are very few people, not possessing the handicaps listed above, who are
incapable of learning to sight-sing. Yet there are very
few good sight-singers. The principle reason for this is
that music teachers are trained neither to sight-sing nor
to teach sight-singing. A music education major's sightsinging training generally involved less than fifteen
minutes a week for two or three years. This sight-singing is almost always neither comprehensive nor concise.
Sight-singing exercises which do not cover all the
possibilities of pitch, clefs, meter, and rhythm will obviously not enable a person to sing at sight all melodic
situations. Time spent on overly repetitive musical examples is time spent unnecessarily. What must be taught
are all pitch possibilities, all keys, all clefs, and a discriminating selection of all types of meter signatures
and rhythmic situations. These things must be taught
thoroughly, but without the needless repetition of already learned material.
For instance, in the following examples, there are all
the possible notes to note melodic progressions excepting octave displacement) in the key of C major.

Elementary mathematics will show that there is no
melodic leap within the key of C major that is not found
here. The same type of exercises can be devised for all
the other major keys, and for all the minor keys. By
working through exercises such as these, one can catalogue his errors and thus study only those melodic
leaps which are difficult for him. Needlessly repeating
melodic leaps that one has already learned is similar to
reading and rereading a third grade reader. No new vocabulary is learned.
The skill of sight-singing melodies that do not remain
in one key or are not in a key at all can be learned in a
similar manner. After all the major and minor "allpossibility" exercises are learned thoroughly, one must
learn to sing exercises based on scales other than major
and minor. The following are scales which the writer
has found useful.
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By mastering "all-possibility" exercises based on the
above scales, one begins to get free of the reliance on
major and minor scales and triads. This is the beginning
of reading by interval, which is the basic tool for sightsinging modulating and non-tonal melodies.
One gradually progresses to "all-possibility" exercises based on the chromatic scale. When these are mastered, there is no melodic leap in our twelve-note-to-theoctave system that one will not have learned.
Stated in other terms, one need only to learn the eleven intervals and thtir octave displacements, and be
able to sing them in the context of any other interval, to
be able to sight-sing the pitches of any melody. This is
not a large amount of material. The following exercises,
for example, show all the melodic possibilities (again,
excepting octave displacement) involving· the interval
of the minor second.
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Musical Example C.
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The same type of exercises are easily devised for
learning to sight-sing all the other intervals in any context.
THE PROCEDURE FOR LEARNING THE EXERcise is very simple. One plays the scale involved, sings
it, and then practices reproducing the pitches of the
scale in the sequence notated in the exercises. By constant referral to the piano, one can always check whether
the pitch he is producing is correct or not. Because the
exercises begin with the pitches of the major scale, most
people will be able to sing the scale immediately. For
those who cannot, they must begin by hearing and reproducing a single pitch, then progressing in a number
of consecutive pitches until reproduction of the major
scale is reached. Although it is possible for a person to
learn sight-singing alone, it is more efficiently accomplished if a teacher is listening, correcting, and analyz-

ing a student's errors, especially with children younger
than eight years old.
All of these exercises must be learned in a rhythmic
context so that fluency of rhythm as well as of pitch reproduction is gained. Examples of all types of beat divisions, beat multiplications, and meter signatures should
be used. All possible positions of the movable C clef
should be used in addition to the bass and treble clefs.
Extensive use of ledger lines above and below the staff
should be used. All possible notations of each pitch and
each interval must be included.
When these exercises are learned a person will be
able to sight-sing any melody that lies within his vocal
range.
After sight-singing becomes an integral part of our
educational system, singers of all ages will be able to
explore the music of literally hundreds of gifted composers! The tedium and uselessness of rote learning will
be replaced by exciting discovery! Since singers will
then be able to sight-sing music not restricted to traditional harmonic schemes, they will have a far greater
understanding of it. Then- and only then- will singers
be equipped to assess its value!
The teaching of sight-singing is not the teaching of
music, just as the teaching of spelling and syntax is not
the teaching of literature. Music and literature are accessible through the respective studies of sight-singing and
spelling and syntax.
Because most adults, including music educators, have
not learned to sight-sing, and therefore have very little
understanding of it, it persists in appearing to be a mysterious talent possessed by only a few. It is not. It is a
skill learnable by almost anyone.
College music departments should insist that their
music education students be able to sight-sing and to
teach sight-singing. Parents and students should insist
that sight-singing replace the rote learning of notes.
Then the adventure of exploring music can comm~nce.
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LAMENT UPON THE PLIGHT
OF THE UPPER-CLASS GENTLEMAN
LOUNGING IN HIS FIFTH-A VENUE
APARTMENT AND ENJOYING A
SECOND MARTINI AT ONLY FOUR P.M.
He's got
No yacht.

WILLIAM M. WHITE
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Thomas G. Hall

NARNIA: THE GOSPEL ACCORDING TO C. S. LEWIS
THE LION, THE WITCH, AND THE WARDROBE.
PRINCE CASPIAN. VOYAGE OF THE DAWN TREADER. THE SILVER CHAIR.
THE HORSE AND HIS BOY. THE MAGICIAN'S NEPHEW. THE LAST BATILE.

By C. S. Lewis. New York: Collier, 1950, ff.

I

AND SO: THE CURTAIN CLOSES ON
fourteen hundred pages of heroic quests and comic
adventures in the Christianized fairy tale world of
Narnia. But thanks to the art of C.S. Lewis, this is
never the last chapter for readers of the sevenvolume Narnia chronicles. For most, I have been
told, it is merely the first of many rereadings about
the colorful and touching life-history of the Narnians. Indeed, Narnia is to fantasy what War &
Peace is to fiction and what the New Testament
is to theology. As Lewis has promised, it is "Chapter One of the Great Story, which goes on for ever:
in which each chapter is better than the one before."
"A Clerk there was of Oxenford .... Sownynge
in moral vertu was his speche/And gladly wolde
he Ierne and gladly teche." This might well have
been Lewis's epitaph. He is regarded as one of the
most widely-read and brilliantly logical scholars
in the twentieth century. Theologians regard him
as one of the most important Christian writers in
decades. For myself, Lewis is a kind of Christian
Socrates, a spiritual gadfly who has stung the public into a painful rethinking of religious priorities.
According to his colleagues and students at Cambridge and Oxford, Lewis was immensely effective
as both a teacher and lecturer- he always spoke
to an overflow capacity, regardless of the topic.
And apparently he was virtually untouchable in
an argument, but never to the point of being vindictive or spiteful; one had the impression he was
armed with a cannon while his opponent only had
a toy pistol.
Today, Lewis's appeal is still increasing by leaps
and bounds, not only to readers of the Narm'q.
Thomas G. Hall teaches in the Department of
English at Valparaiso University. He received
the MA (1968) from San Francisco State University and the PhD (1971) from Washington State
University, Pullman, Washington.
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tales (which have been the top seller in Penguin's
Puffin series for children and are now a top seller
for MacMillan) and the splendid space trilogyOut of the Silent Planet, Peralandra, and That
Hideous Strength- but also to readers of his theology and literary criticism. His work has been
eclectic in the best sense of that term. All in all,
Lewis is the author of more than forty books (and
a host of essays), including the huge Oxford English Literature in the Sixteenth Century (a highly esteemed literary history), Experiment in Crit,·cism (a text for courses in critical theory), Selected Literary Essays (on topics ranging from
Chaucer and Shakespeare to the Romantics and
Moderns), and Surprised by Joy (an autobiography)- to mention only a handful. Generally, the
best sellers, excluding fantasy, have been Mere
Christianity, The Screwtape Letters, and The
Problem of Pain. The amazing scope of ideas
found in these works is matched by a similar diversity on the part of Lewis readers, a fact which is
made clear by the recent Annotated Bibliography:
C.S. Lewis-a book which runs nearly four hundred pages. C.S. Lewis Societies have been established in England, Los Angeles, Portland, and
New York, and there are several C.S. Lewis bulletins and newsletters. Journals have devoted entire
issues to his work, as have national conferences
and conventions. Libraries have invested large
sums to obtain his works and private possessions,
the Bodelian Library at Oxford and Wheaton College, to name two. All of this spells out one"fact:
that Lewis is a storyteller and critic of the highest
order. Nowhere is this more evident than in his
fantasy. Narnia, I should like to argue, is perhaps
as representative of Lewis's genius as any of his
books, the essence of which, I believe, is both dramatic and pictorial. C.S. Lewis is both the Shakespeare and the Wordsworth of children's literature.
SIMPLY ON THE LEVEL OF STORY CONstruction, the Narnia chronicles are remarkable
conceptions. In The Lion, the Witch, and the
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Wardrobe, the four main characters-Peter, Edmund, Susan, and Lucy-stumble into the fantasy
world of Narnia through the vehicle of a magic
wardrobe. There they run into the crusty witch
Jadis, a sadistic usurper who has perverted the
natural order of things by turning animals into
statues and by arresting the cycle of nature at icy
winter-without Christmas. Jadis, as we find out,
has forced the loyal talking animals into a cruel
master-slave relationship. This is the reader's
introduction to two recurring motifs in the chronicles: (1) the conflict between innocence and corruption; (2) the destruction of nature and animal
life. The plot turns when Aslan, the Lion-King of
Narnia, short-circuits her spell, allowing spring
to rush in. This sets the stage for a decisive clash
between Asian and Jadis, an archetypal good versus evil battle that is played out in all of the tales.
But if the scale seems to have shifted in favor of
the loyal Narnians , it has done so only momentarily, for a tragic circumstance develops: Jadis,
with her deep magic, gets Asian to agree to forfeit
his life as a sacrificial offering. All seems doomed,
irretrievably. Asian is slain on the Stone Table in
a symbolic crucifixion scene. However, in characteristic Lewis fashion , despair in the face of such
evil proves to be unwarranted, and its opposite,
hope, is the predictable anticipation of a reversal
of tragic action. In short, as expected and wished
for, Asian is resurrected and leads the final victory
over J adis and her minions. All ends well, in fact
joyously. A typical Lewis happy ending.
In Prince Caspian, a quest-tale riddled with political intrigue, the same children once again sneak
through the boundaries of time and space, this
time through the unexpected medium of a railway platform. Caspian, the rightful ruler of Narnia, needs their help to regain the throne his greedy
Uncle Miraz has seized. Together, they rally with
myriad mythical creatures and articulate animals
to plan a counterattack. Suffice it to say, when they
finally square off with the enemy, they more than
demonstrate their mettle. Aslan once again provides the spiritual leadership.
The Voyage of the Dawn Treader, perhaps my
favorite , is compounded of elements of carnival,
mysticism, and satire in a general atmosphere of
lighthearted comedy. The story takes off when Edmund and Lucy, accompanied by their meddlesome, priggish cousin Eustace Scrubb, crash
through a framed seascape into a very wet ocean.
Along with Caspian and Reepicheep, an Arthurlike talking mouse whose knightly fearlessness
shows Lewis's debt to medieval tradition, they embark on a riotous quest for the end of the world.
One of the highlights of the book is Scrubb's outrageous metamorphosis into a------ (you shall have
to read the story to find out). Towards the end, as
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the heroes sail into the utter East, they have some
glorious times, none of which for fear of spoiling
the story, I had better retell. Only a hint: the final
chapters show Reepicheep sailing valiantly into a
mystical, impressionistic sunset to settle his claims
with the Lord of Narnia. The Voy age of the Dawn
Treader is perhaps Lewis's best use of the Sehn sucht motif in the Narnia tales.
The central figures in The Silver Chair are the
reformed Scrubb (in more ways than one) and a
runaway schoolgirl, Jill Pole. The opening scenes
are thrillingly pictorial. Jill and Eustace fall off
the edge of a towering precipice and soar through
space on the breath of a friendly wind. After they
land, they find themselves in the midst of a magnificent Narnian setting. Then promptly they are
given their task, which is to rescue Prince Rilian
who has been kidnapped and enchanted by the
evil Queen of the Underworld- the archetypal
witch of darkness. To carry this out, they team up
with a Marshwiggle named Puddleglum, one of
the truly unforgettable portraits in Lewis's gallery
of la condition humaine. After tight jams and
comic complications on the road, they find Rilian,
but not until their heroism has been put to the test
by inclement weather and brutish giants. The most
exciting part of the whole adventure , at least in
my opinion, takes place when the children and
Puddleglum match wits with the witch's magic. In
these scenes Lewis plays with ideas from Plato and
the New Testament about differentlevels of imaginative reality. The dialogue between Puddleglum
and the Witch is a succinct summation of his view
of the function of religious fantasy and the purpose of the Christian imagination. In predictable
Lewis style, again, providence saves the day for
our friends, in the surprising form of Puddleglum's optimistic pessimism- you have to know
Puddleglum to know what I mean. At any rate,
the heroes hold forth against the witch-serpent and
occasion her self-destruction. Rilian's spell is broken at long last. Before they make it safely back
to Narnia, however, there is a bizarre interlude at
the Bottom of the World, a Dantean place where
the gloomiest people imaginable are consigned to
live. The heroes manage to escape, of course, and
eventually surface into a picturesque, snowy winter night in Narnia. In a typically festive celebration (the Narnians are not teetotalers), Rilian is
officially restored to his proper throne. The Silver Chair is Lewis at his myth-making best.
The next tale in the series is The Horse and His
Boy. This is a story about Shasta, an orphan slave
who searches for his father and his own identity,
and a talking horse named Bree. The excitement
begins when they escape the clutches of Shasta's
pseudo-father and head for Narnia and the north.
Directly after being hounded by Asian in a wild
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chase, they meet up with another pair of expatriots: the proud Aravis and her horse-companion
Hwin. The four of them travel to the enemy city
Tashbaan where Shasta is mistaken for Prince
Corin, who later, as we might have expected, is
revealed to be his brother. The suspense heightens
when Shasta is taken into the courtly fold. The
mistaken identity motif is duplicated by other
scenes. There is also a parallel plot involving
Aravis and Susan, both of whom are being pursued by repulsive suitors. This unrequited love
theme leads to both serious and hilarious tangles,
the chief of which occurs when Prince Rabadash
the Calormen declares war on the N amians as a
cover-up for his vendetta against Susan. The dialogue in these scenes is simply superb. Happily,
the N amians later make short shrift of Rabadash
and his troops. The Calormens are routed in a
comically contested but vigorously fought battle.
What happens to Rabadash I have sworn not to
mention- only that his punishment is commensurate with his personality.
The Magician's Nephew should perhaps be read
first, or so say some readers, since it reveals AsIan's creation of Namia. The main characters are
Digory, Polly, Uncle Andrew, the witch Jadis, and
a cabby. Uncle Andrew is a power-happy, thwarted
magician who tricks Polly and Digory into testing
his enchanted rings, only because he is too chickenhearted to try them himself. After finding themselves in a magical world, Digory and Polly lock
grips with Jadis, but to no avail; she worms her
way back to England with them, hoping to take
over their world. She fails in some rollickingly
funny scenes; then the plot takes a sudden tum,
and they all jettison back to N amia. And here begins the famous creation sequence in which Aslan
designs the Namian topography with his music.
The only problem is that, in spite of Asian's power,
evil is brought into the world. But the end is one of
incomparable joy, and Asian's love remains incontestable.
Everyone likes The Last Battle. It concerns a
Napoleonic Ape named Shift who desires the overthrow of Namia, and Puzzle, a naively helpless
donkey who becomes his "yes-man." The plot is
far too excellent to sum up in more than a cursory
way. Generally what happens is this: Shift disguises himself as Aslan in order to implement his
plan and tricks the otherwise loyal N amians into
"patriotic" and "religious" support. The rest of
the story deals with the disastrous results and ultimate failure of this plan. To a large extent, the
scheme in The Last Battle is apocalyptic and
eschatological. The concluding battle is waged in
the name of Asian's revelation of spiritual truth
and justice. For many readers, myself included,
this is one of the most moving of all the tales, esJune, 1975

pecially in terms of Lewis's treatment of death and
resurrection. The finish is a fireworks-filled finale
to the N amia quest and a touching witness to
Lewis's Christian imagination.

II

BRIEFLY, THEN, THIS IS THE STORY OF
Namia. How shall we evaluate it and define the
nature and purpose of Lewis's art? Is fantasy as
viable a literary form as any other genre? I shall
argue that it is and that, in fact, it is unique for
several reasons. First, given its otherworldly levels
of meaning and multidimensional reality, it offers
the writer a number of flexible devices and strategies: supernatural settings (ones not governed
by known spatial or temporal laws), mythical and
spiritual analogies, and idealized characters and
heroes. Second, given the imaginative premise of
an otherworld logos, it enables him to treat the
transphenomenal as a reality of its own, as a "place"
with believable people, landscape, and ideas, and
true-to-life situations. To authenticate this imaginary universe, the fantasist has to be a master
magician in his use of descriptive detail and in
his depiction of credible human motive beneath
the disguise of animal or creature personality.
Most important, and this holds true for fiction as
well, his Weltanschauung has to have a realistic
base- that is, a sense of causal order and inevitability in terms of ideas and action. In Narnia Lewis
satisfies all of these requirements and more. It is
the ordered form of his esthetic and spiritual wishfulfillment, a world where the psychic and Christian contents of consciousness are given full embodiment.
Lewis's ontology of fantasy is an expression of
the spiritual side of his commitment to the Sehnsucht theme in world literature. It shows his longing for a world where things might be conceived
on an idealized scale of love and freedom, where
human relationships might be seen in a state of
potential perfectibility. In this perspective, he
reverses the inward direction of Descartes' "I think
therefore I exist," with a projected, or outer-directed "I wish therefore I exist." This is no easy
escapism formula, however, since it means going
deeper into the human psyche and, ultimately,
from the standpoint of Lewis's faith, deeper into
spiritual consciousness. Lewis refers to this process in The Last Battle as going "further up and
further in," ~hich means, as I hope to show, going
deeper into the metaphorical structure of Christian faith . The language of religious belief in
Narnia deals specifically with the archetypal' essence of man's imaginative being. As such, Narnia
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offers a special kind of Existenzerhellung, an
illumination of the idealized esthetic constructs
of the Christian imagination. In accordance with
this ontology, the Narnian heroes follow an archetypal pattem of psychic alienation and imaginative rebirth on their spiritual joumey. The scheme
is roughly as follows: (1) the undeveloped, unfit,
innocent hero is initiated into a fairy tale world
of injustice, corruption, and deception; (2) the
hero quests for self-perfectibility through a series
of taxing encounters with evil, during which time
he becomes increasingly self-conscious of both his
limitations and his possibilities; (3) the hero joyously wins his battle with evil, is purged and rebaptized in the imagination, and achieves a Christlike plateau of ideal selfhood. Thus, beyond the
action itself, the quest for self is an extension of
Lewis's interest in mystical visions of the meaning
of life; it is the instrumentation of his Christian
development of traditional mythical rituals of
initiation, dislocation, and rebirth- most of which,
I believe, serve the purpose of redemption or
grace. This spiritual joumey is the central organizing principle in Lewis's narrative art and the metaphorical agency of his witness to Christ in fantasy.
According to Lewis's Christian esthetic of fantasy, action is primarily a function of self-definition. The context of heroism, chivalry, and romance provides the N amian hero with analogues
for experience in the "real" world of Englandartistic models, so to speak. At the same time, it
refracts those possibilities for the reader in his
own "real" world of imaginative experience. The
quest, thus, is the determining factor in the moral
equation of Christian fantasy like Narnia, not only
in the sense that it anticipates an inward disclosure
.o f the hero's spiritual identity, but also in the
sense that it formulates that problem initially as
the unknown x in all mystical Christian consciousness. Lewis's approach thus is distinctively his own
because it allows him to differentiate the twodimensional psychic consciousness of the folk tale
world from the multilevelled consciousness of
Christian fantasy. It allows him to work out the
dynamics of the archetypal good versus evil conflict as a symbolic encounter between the satanic
and angelic elements in the human imagination.
The hero is called by Asian to restore the human
condition to a more divine order; and, since in
fantasy anything can happen, the hero gives an
ideal witness to the heroic urgency of that calling.
This ideal heroic response explains, at least to my
mind, the Christian significance of the pervasive
illusion-reality motif in Narnia- most noticeably
in The Silver Chair and The Last Battle. Only by
recognizing the implicit meaning behind events
in the "real" world can the hero distinguish between deceptive standards of behavior and higher
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ideals of perfection. Aslan witnesses to the unselfconscious children in Narnia in order to lovingly
intimidate them with his truth. He teaches them
the way of heroic action and inner belief. In each
story the children answer Asian's call for them to
participate in a spiritual quest for a visionary or
transcendent frame of reference that will serve .
them to measure the exact nature of the world's
evil.
LEWIS'S METHOD IS TO INTRODUCE
characters who, because of their intrinsic weaknesses- the chief of which is their lack of perceptual power- fail at the outset to distinguish appearance from reality. Such a strategy is effective
not only in terms of the plot itself, but also with
regard to the reader's anticipation of a predictable
fairy tale happy ending; it implies that an atypical
hero will ideally surmount the seemingly impos·
sible conditions imposed upon him by the quest.
From the standpoint of this presupposed final
victory over evil, Lewis's characterization is the
manifestation of a Darwinian paradox: the survival of the unfittest. For me, this underscores Lewis's
preoccupation with a happy, eschatological ending in history. Fantasy in his hands parallels the
story of Revelation and makes incamate the archetypal dreams of Christian faith. In this connection,
Narnia represents a metaphysical reconciliation
of the problem of appearance and reality; heroic
action is the correlative of Christ's anticipated
victory over appearance. Therefore, in the theological terms implied by L.ewis's ontology of fantasy, heroic self-perfectibility is a shade more than
a traditional reshaping of myth, legend, folklore,
and romance for the sake of telling a good story; it
is Lewis's pledge to the cause of an inferential
reality behind the evil vestments of the "real"
world.
The eschatological nature of the self-quest in
Narnia explains the function of discipleship motifs
and Passion-Story analogues in an imaginary worldas-I-wish-it. In this anticipated fantasy paradise,
naive self-awareness begins as an unfinished mode
of consciousness but ends as a completed act of
selfhood. The heroes inNarnia are finally idealized
out of existence, as it were, because their fate is to
enter into the mystery of Christian being beyond
the phenomenal world; thus, their·quest for absolute self-being (or, as I have suggested, for their
archetypal essence) is necessarily conceptual in
purpose; it is always associated with gradations of
potential self-realization through heroic encounters with images of metaphysical evil. Such a quest,
furthermore, prefigures an eschatological solution
of the question of identity insofar as it tends to
resolve all approaches to the meaning of human
experience and insofar as it attempts to remove
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that very issue from the realm of human definition.
Lewis's rubric of fantasy puts its own high premium on the happy ending because such an ideal
consummation of the hero's spiritual wanderings
is the last chapter in the story of his battle with
his own Christian shortcomings. From this perspective, heroic action bears witness to the children's self-questing potential and the otherworld's
reward of self-revelation.
A word on the structure and intention of this
principle of self-revelation with regard to the
language of fantasy. By definition, any implementation of the archetypal self-quest in literature is
metaphorical. The language of fantasy does not
operate according to the strict laws of fiction , but
rather, according to the "rules" of dream-logic and
Christian belief. The realism of Narnia is the consequence of its believable inner life and its coherence as a tale about a preferred order of things in
a wished-for universe of poetic justice. The basis
of this idealization, or so I believe, is the unselfconsciousness of childhood dreaming. Like Wordsworth, Lewis proposes the paradox that the child
is father of the man; by which he means that a
child's imagination is innately in touch with fantasy-like constructions because he is not yet selfconscious to an adult degree about workable distinctions between appearance and reality; the
child's imagination perceives untold fantasy like
connections (the analogues I spoke of above) between illusion and fact; in short, the child instinctively separates art from life. An anti-fantasy reader, or I might add, an anti-religious fantasy reader,
is often overly equivocal about this distinction
and fails to appreciate the imaginative premise of
all good literature. This kind of reader protests
too much in behalf of his own fantasy sympathies.
Obviously, the "truth" of any story, whether fantasy, fiction, or whatever, is unique to its own
peculiar artistry and world view, as well as to the
author's distinctive style. Enjoying hypothetical
probabilities, whether or not they deal with images
of a spiritual noumena or a surrealistic otherworld,
is clearly not the same as believing in them as
scientific propositions or historical evidence. Believing in them as images of the truth of the inner
life, however, is something else entirely. I think
this is what Narnia is all about.
Nevertheless, this distinction raises a critical
question about the very nature of Lewis's ontology
of fantasy: is the reader's childlike approach to
Narnia a condition of religious or imaginative
faith or a combination of both? In spite of the fact
that Lewis himself argued that a reader is never
forced in an a priori manner to accept or approve
the logos of a work, it remains true, I should reply,
that such is usually the case with readers of Narnia. For many Christian readers, indeed, the story
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of Asian is the Word of God made incarnate. Now
Lewis, I am sure, would have applauded this apologia, but he would have answered that the Narnia
tales were first and foremost his experiment in the
art form of the fairy tale. So be it. My own students,
I am afraid, might wish to cross swords with Lewis
over this issue, and argue that if Narnia is anything, it is Christian fantasy. I think this is a valid
rejoinder, although I would add that even if the
chronicles are reducible to something this easily
schematic, their riches are infinitely greater than
such a methodology pretends to encompass ..
Perhaps we had better make a further distinction between a spiritual and an esthetic principle
of incarnation. As a verbal structure, Narnia functions as a vehicle through which Lewis expresses
and artistically validates his own imagined truths
about an ideal Christian life. In this generic sense,
as I hope I have made clear, its meaning is essentially analogical. As a fantasist, Lewis makes the
word flesh, so to speak, by giving his other worldly
setting the illusion of concrete actuality. The medium of fantasy allows him to reshape and unify
inherited stories from whatever source into a new
but comprehensive secondary world. The Christianized meaning unfolded by this scaffolding of
dimly or clearly recognizable levels of the imagination is by intention something more than what
it appears to be in itself; that is to say, even for the
Christian reader, it is always something "other"
than the specific consciousness in which it symbolically lives by virtue of the various possible
relationships brought into play by otherworldly
levels. The symbolic suggestiveness of this multilevelled otherworld is the whole point.
One last point: the escapism formula of Christian fantasy such as Lewis has developed it in
Narnia, gives him the poetic and philosophical
leeway to portray several of these inferential realities and present them in dramatic conflict. The
reader can escape into whichever one he prefers,
depending, of course, on the degree to which he
wishes or is able to suspend either his disbelief or
his belief. Whether or not he projects his Christian feelings onto the Narnia logos or opens up to
those pictured in its pages, is always a matter of
personal choice and sensibility. The fact is, in
either case, such escapism is a good thing. The
Narnia chronicles are read over and over again
not simply because they are un-put-down-able as
stories, nor simply because they provide symbolic
analogues of the Christian life (and they do so to a
remarkable degree) , but because they touch the
inner life in all of us. They hold up a mirror to our
own imagination, the reversed image of which is
the "truth" of our essential being. The quest for
this truth was the quibble over which Lewis was
willing to risk the whole world.
f
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THEATER--WALTER SORELL

Farewell to a Season

ONE CAN LOOK BACK AT
the past season neither in great and
justified anger nor with any particular joy. Although the theatrical experience through all these months
has not been too memorable, nevertheless, it was remarkable in many
ways.
People wondered a great deal
about the surprising box-office success of most shows in this year of
inflation and recession. But at any
period in which the devaluation of
life reaches frightening proportions, pleasure in all its manifestations becomes the only desired aim
and deceptive solace. It was, by all
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standards, a very rich season, and
yet one in which no new American
playwright was heard of, while two
of the established ones failed.
One of them was the wizard of the
Boulevard comedy: Neil Simon. He
thought he could transplant the
story of the Book of Job to a rich
Jewish family living on Long Island.
The Bible's Job had already shaken
his head with great doubts about
Archibald MacLeish's ].B. -a more
serious attempt at its theatricalization several years back- and now
could not help but damn Neil Simon's God's Favorite as utterly inept. Edward Albee fared somewhat
better with his new play, Seascape,
which, I think, is one of those magnificent failures, testifying to the
author's stature in certain ways without being quite right and convincing.
Strangely enough, it is a thin and,
for a full-length play, short dramatic
exploration of a wonderful theme:
the adventure in rediscovering life.
There is a new beginning around the
corner, or it may be, also for a couple apparently too fast advancing
towards the end of the middle-aged
period. This is how "she" feels while
being with "him" on a beach somewhere, unwilling to accept the finality of it all while his responses to
her enthusiasm are those of a tired
businessman: "We'll see!" or "Let
it go!" But she doesn't believe in his
resigned, "We've earned a little
life," even though her great monologue of "to have had it or to live our
last chance to the full" goes on a trifle too long. But so far the play's
theme that life can and must be discovered anew at any age, or rather
at any turn of one's aging process,
makes sense, and certainly the last
word spoken in bright sunshine
sounded encouraging: "Begin!"
The trouble with the play begins
in the second part when Albee uses
a device which inadvertently cheapens the idea. Two humanoid lizards
appear on the beach where our couple wrestles with the idea of making
a new start. The introduction of
these humanized beasts is at best a
cute gimmick with many inherent
dangers. How can the playwright

make it credible that also lizards
speak, let alone in a more or less
Americanese lingo with Mr. Lizard's
utterances of "Wow!" and "Listen
here, Buddy!"? When the human
species and the Lacertilia kind of
reptiles start investigating their
genetic and habitual differences the
humor deteriorates into funny asides
reminiscent of those made in high
school biology classes to keep up the
students' interest. Albee holds up
the mirror to man's nature, a mirror
reflecting the lizard image of another
married couple. That this may be
amusing at points is not disputed,
but such a one-act confrontation is
an easy and cheap way out and pushes
the play into an abyss instead of
plunging it into depths. When Mr.
Lizard thought that "It's rather dangerous up here," he must also have
thought of the hazards of playwriting.
NEAR-PERFECT FARCE
A
which, physically, outdoes Feydeau
at every topsy-turvy turn, was written by Terrence McNally and called
The Ritz which is a hotel-cum-bathhouse. It has conventional and less
conventional facilities for the enjoyment of a gay crowd and more doors
and cubicles than any stage can possibly provide for. As most farces this
too makes the best of mistaken identities and, based on the idea of "the
more the merrier," there are so many
of them that it would take pages to
deal with them. If you throw into
your farcical bedlam the terror of
the Mafia and such types as a frightfully overweight man, a private detective in Mafia employ with a penetratingly high-pitched voice, a garbage collector's wife disguised as a
man, a Puerto Rican chanteuse who
can no longer sing but wants to make
a new career and mistakes the man
trying to escape the Mafia for a
theatrical producer while being herself mistaken for a transvestite, etc.,
then you can imagine what reckless and almost plotless contrivances
can lead to. The minute everyone's
mistaken identity is established the
chase begins and is climaxed by three
very divergent people winding up
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under a cot while on top the game of
errors by two other characters continues to take place. All the jokes
come somewhat artificially; th.e..
propelling moto of a p lot leading
to the laughter is missing. N~verfhe
less, the laughs ax:e there.
A1i""d so1h~y are'in a ID,9S.t e_c ono.m ie
€omed1y with no more ~han two peopl~, B/z1m e Time, Next Year, by a
new d:r:amasist·- but kno~ fr.om
television- Bernard Slade. Two
peopl(}.; in a way h~ppily mar-ried,
al'ihough not to qne another, fall ip
love and meet once a year. J'he
years fn:lm f951 to 1975 pass•with the
evidence o passing yea,rs. We see
the couple six times, and they .~eem
to en),oy this once-a-year ex,.Q_UI;:sion
into an illicit romance as much as
the audience. The jokes, m,os_tly
clipped sentences, seem superimposed and have the appearance
qf qeing put int'o dramatized foiin
f_rom noteboo.ks, but they are s_ki11fnlly ·placed ana work very weU
fer an audience envying the guiltridden courage of these, two cha_ra€ters. But what is really ,en~oyable
and admirable about this new sexy
version of the old comegy :idea of
The Fourposte-r of many years ago
is the reflection of the socio-cultural
changes of the American scene ihat,
time and again, show up in their
conversation.
TH
MOST REMARKABLE
feature of this season was the avalanche o£ revivals of older plays,
dassic and semi-classic, on and, off
Broadway. It would be natural to
expect the two major British com.panies, The National Theatre and1
The Royal Shakespeare Co~R.any,
to sqpport us in our endeavor to
look back; and thi~, particularly
with Shakespea,re in various an.a
sometimes strange versions·, they
have dutifully and, in mos( <;_ases~
beautifully done. It was even more
fascinating to find Ibsen in the forefmnt of thege revivals with Ghos£5
in an avant-garde th.eatre'IIQowntown
or A Doll's Housei at the Vivien
Beaumont Theatre at Lincoln g enter. The latter, qy the way, wa.§. a
much heralded but disappojntingly
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uneven production in which the
brilliant Swedish star, Liv Ullmann,
taught us how Nora ought to be
acted.
One cannot help asking what the
heightened interest in Ibsen, one oC
the great realistic playwrights who
freed th.e well-made-play from its
trivialities and gave a new meaning
to economic dramaturgy can mean.
Have·we rediscovered him in an era
in which loosely structured, if not
non sequitur, plays prevail and the
aifgument for a theme is often supported by four-letter words? . His
topics are no longer hotly debated
issues, and the battles he fought
for reason and clean thinking have
meanwhile been won for him by
time-more odess. I think we clip.g
to him again today because we are
bad1y in need of being reminded of
the importance of h.uman integrity
and vitality which have become b~
fouled by the corruptibility and
sham conventionalities of societ ~.
ENSEMBLE
THE
NEGRO
Company at the St. Marks has somewhat enriched at least one sector of
the·of~-Broadway theatre with Leslie
Lee's The First Breeze of Summer, a
milieu play consisting of many short
scenes and depicting the life. and
background of a relatively well-todo black family. It is a play of many
convincing moments, of a variety of
moods and dramatic situations, with.
flashbacks depicting black-white and
black-black relationships. It certainly is a play that has the power of
promise~ and merits the author's
e_ncourageipent.
~ young but already known black
dramatist, Ed Bullins, has written a
firrepla_y, The. Taking of'Miss feti_nie,
_a kaleidoscopic pictull.e of some,
_ytmng people in the" six ties. The.
central scene is a P¥t)l which thr£e'
black :r::oommat~§_, _giVce .4:or their !former fniends ~n ,college. Tpe parj y is
o:r:tly 11; point of departl!lre from which
the dramatist thro;ws light on the
life of a few people and thei? strugg~e with being and·beipg 'l:hemselves.
So:g1e of the figur:_es, whites and
blacks, gentiles and Jews, are character studies in depth_, . oth:e_xs li):e more

lightly touched "Upon. They all seem
to grope for some understanding of
a puzzling li'£~ The play is written
like a,. fugue w,ith many m2nologues,
chor'!,l speeches, and movements.
It was originally produced far offBroadway: at the Henry Street Pla,.yhous.e and ~aken to tfie Newhouse'
Theatre on Lincoln Cent& by J$ seph Papp.
This :r.nay be tbe first' of ;:t series. df
new ·plays by younger .8merjcan
auth0rs which Papp will produce .at'
of_!-Broadw,ay stages dbwntown and
perhap,s later show at LincQ.ln Qenter in case they fit the requi'rements
expected by or demanded fro~ the
bou.rgeois theater-goer. One o the
mo:r:e significant developments this
seas on was J osep Pap,p:S frank admission that his policy of turning the
Vivi.en Beaumont Theatre into an
avant-garde stage failed. He lost his
audie-n ce.._ The people apparently
ex:pected from qim a kind of National
Theatre with a program of classic
and new plays of some respectability. 'Ihes rejected the confusing
groping, the milita~ OJ; four-letterworn plays with which he filled his
Public Theatre downtown.
Papp pr:omised.to present a repertory theater of proven plays, mainly
classics. In his recantation, I believe,
he went too fax;. Does he really believe he cannot find a IP~aywright
whoiJhas something to ~y an"d who
can SJ;ty it without spitting at his
audience with the fury ot his despair
·a nd throwing the excrements of his
disgust at them?' In hisxesigned mood
Joseph. Papp ·e ven vowed he would
tear down1the bea..,u tifuii y bull t Vivien
Beaumont Theatre and tum its
thrust sfage into a good old:=fashioned
prosc.e.nium stage, re-evoking yester:day's spirit for much money. He
seems to feel he can more easily get
the money for such an apparently
unnecessary purpose than to find a
pla)'CY'Tight who could honor the
spir'it o,f man, please Melpomene or
Thalia and his auaiences.
There is..t a time when everyone,
but pJ~rtioularly man endowed with
creativity, must stop and tum and
look inward a little~ And now may
be the ti'me fQr i~.
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Dear Reader of this letter:
Perhaps it is foolish for me, an ordinary man, to send you this letteP.
I know that your time is valuable. But would you please look over these lines
that I am sending you from far away, then I shall be glad.
II
I am an unknown man. My occupation is that of oiler.
I travel on the sea, on vessels where I grease bearings and gears.
My occupation did not exist in the time of the Carpenter.
I
'
The era which can be called that of the oiler is mine.
It belongs to the times which have, and have had, metal wheels.

•

My occupation has not matured to the point of being thought of as symbolic l.
People want to rush forward ~rapidly and for this they use all sort.s oJ wheels
and gears.
But they want to retain the symbols and signs of'a n older period,
such as the sickle in the time of harvesting machines and the scythe as the
symbol of death ·n the time of the machine gun,
and the word wagon in the era of the throe thrower .
T~y mean that the older and prehistoric concepts are eternal, and perhaps
llhey are right.
They mean that my occupation, tha,t of oiler, is temporary, and perhaps they
are right.
Which it will be depends on how much oil they require,
1
and how they intend to use the oil,
•
1
11
if it will be for a still faster dance
•
or to pour oil on troubled waters.
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They themselves and their symbols and my occupation, that of oiler, stand or
fall according to how they use the oil.
In all ages there have been people who have stepped forward to ask questions.
Their eyes have been searching.
Such searching eyes existed before sickles and scythes were invented.
And right now there comes one who asls,s how the oil is to be used,
so that aU those who now are rushing fast will not go too fast towards
something where even 't he oldest symbols of harvest will become meaningless
in comparison with the newer arrangements for harvest of all sorts .
I am as'king this only because my occupation is that of oiler, and because,
we now have methods of oiling which create an extraordinarily smooth glide
for both good and bad,
and perhaps a still smoother gliding for the blind.
I beg you once more to have patience with regard to these my lines,
and sorry to have bothered you with this,
Sincerely,
•
The Oiler
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*This poemcwas tra nslated [rom the Swedi sh by Emeroy J hn-son.
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